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SOME trademarks inspire love.  There are people who wear rain coatscovered in pictures of McDonald’s Big Mac sandwich.1  Some join
clubs where members are expected to have Harley Davidson’s logo tat-
tooed on their bodies.2  Some even choose to be buried in a coffin embla-
zoned with NASCAR imagery.3  While it is possible to dismiss these
individuals as both rare and absurd, this level of devotion by consumers
makes it clear that some trademarks have fans for reasons that surpass the
quality of the product or service offered.  Numerous fan groups exist on
websites and social media to provide consumers with the opportunity to
share their love and commitment to a trademarked product or service.4
Communities can develop around trademarks online or in the real world
in much the same way that they develop around shared geographical or
cultural interests.  This development of fervent fandom around a trade-
mark, including the creation of active trademark-related social communi-
ties, demonstrates a shift in business management such that trademarks
are now only one element of a larger brand development strategy.  While
consumers may coalesce around the trademark as a unifying symbol of
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1. See Victoria Taylor, McDonald’s Launches Big Mac Fashion and Lifestyle Line,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 26, 2015, 10:09 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-
style/eats/mcdonald-launches-big-mac-fashion-lifestyle-collection-article-1.2163002
[https://perma.cc/97F2-KYDF].
2. See Nisha Patel, 35 Groovy Harley Davidson Tattoos, SLODIVE, http://slodive
.com/inspiration/harley-davidson-tattoos/ [https://perma.cc/5PRV-8ZG7] (last
visited Jan. 11, 2016).
3. See generally 15 Weird and Wacky Coffins, CREMATION RESOURCE, http://www
.cremationresource.org/cremation/15-weird-and-wacky-coffins.html [https://per
ma.cc/TG56-L996] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (showing several different coffins
decorated with trademarks associated with Apple iPhones, Super Nintendo con-
trollers, and Nokia cell phones); Who Are Funerals Really For?, TWO VIEWS, http://
www.two-views.com/article_funerals.html [https://perma.cc/G7S6-YSUD] (last
visited Mar. 1, 2016).
4. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Social Media Amplify Consumer Investment in Trade-
marks, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1491, 1506 (2012) (“Social media have empowered consum-
ers to use trademarks to gain more information, make a broader expressive impact
and connect to a larger, more dispersed community.”).
(45)
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their fandom, they are really identifying with the brand story or brand
personality that has developed in connection with that mark.
Because brands incorporate one or more trademarks, legal disputes
involving brands have been addressed as trademark disputes.  Trademark
law has actually evolved and expanded to attempt to accommodate this
larger concept of brands.  Unfortunately for the brand owner seeking to
cultivate loyal brand fans, brands have not fit smoothly into the strictures
of trademark law.  Trademark laws aiming to prevent consumer confusion
and counterfeiting have inadvertently led to the stifling of non-competi-
tive brand activities by consumers.  As a result of this disconnect in the law,
trademark owners may feel that they are required to stop consumer use of
their marks, despite marketing scholarship that suggests consumer-initi-
ated brand communities and other fan activities are the best way of build-
ing brand loyalty and future sales.  For example, the official website for the
LEGO Group (corporate owner of the LEGO brand line of toys and, relat-
edly, the LEGO trademark) enjoins consumer fans from using the LEGO
trademark and insists that “the LEGO logo NEVER be used on an unoffi-
cial web site” or as part of an Internet address for such a website.5  In 2003,
the LEGO Group sent a cease-and-desist letter to just such a fan-operated
website that ultimately resulted in the site being shut down.6
More recently, IKEA’s general counsel sent a cease-and-desist letter to
the operator of the website www.IKEAhackers.net.7  The website was cre-
ated in 2006 to collect and share ideas for ways to modify or “hack” prod-
ucts sold by IKEA, an international retailer known for affordable and
minimalist furniture and home goods.8  Submissions collected by the web-
site operator (or submitted by users) ranged from minor embellishments
of standard IKEA products to complete redesigns of an IKEA product to
turn it into a more customized piece of furniture.9  The website developed
a large and enthusiastic fan base.  The fact that IKEA inspired this success-
ful consumer-created website and allowed it to flourish without corporate
involvement was touted as evidence of IKEA’s genius brand management
strategy in marketing literature.10  However, IKEA’s recent cease-and-
desist letter alleged that both the website domain name and the hacks
5. Fair Play, LEGO, http://www.lego.com/en-US/legal/legal-notice/fair-play
[https://perma.cc/42L9-W3DN] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
6. See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conun-
drum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1840 (2007) (describing cease-and-desist letter for
website “located at www.ratemylego.com” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7. See Jules Yap, Big Changes Coming to IKEAHackers, IKEAHACKERS (June 14,
2014), http://www.ikeahackers.net/2014/06/big-changes-coming-to-ikeahackers
.html [https://perma.cc/2JT4-JPQ6].
8. See About, IKEAHACKERS, http://www.ikeahackers.net/about [https://per
ma.cc/TFU8-48EF] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
9. See IKEA Threatens IKEAHacker Website with Cease-and-Desist Notice, NEWS
.COM.AU (June 18, 2014, 7:53 AM), http://www.news.com.au/finance/business/
ikea-threatens-ikeahacker-website-with-ceaseanddesist-notice/story-fnkgdftz-122695
7658920 [https://perma.cc/5K3V-HBCP].
10. See SARAH ROBINSON, FIERCE LOYALTY: UNLOCKING THE DNA OF WILDLY
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss1/2
2016] BRANDS AS COPYRIGHT 47
posted on the site violated IKEA’s intellectual property rights.11  The oper-
ator of the website initially announced that the website would likely be
shut down.12  IKEA customers were livid and sent emails, letters, and
tweets to IKEA’s corporate offices, and demanded that it reconsider.13  A
month later, IKEA withdrew its opposition to the website, which then re-
sumed operation.14
In both of the trademark-related instances described above, the web-
sites and communities that were threatened by trademark owners were
ones that were started by fans.  Participation in these fan-initiated websites
encouraged and supported use of the branded products sold under the
respective trademarks.  One might presume that trademark owners would
love and support this free publicity.  Advertising and marketing firms en-
courage such fan-initiated efforts and often call brand communities the
marketing platform of the future.15  After receiving IKEA’s cease-and-de-
sist letter, the owner of the IKEAHackers website stated, “IKEAhackers.net
was set up in 2006 and truly not with the intent to exploit their mark.  I
was [just a] crazy fan.  In retrospect, a naı¨ve one too.”16  In a time when
trademark owners are routinely called “bullies”17 and mocked online and
SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITIES 59–61 (2012) (describing Ikea’s decision to allow site to
proliferate as intelligent from business standpoint).
11. See Drew Prindle, Update: IKEA May Back Off on IKEAHackers Cease and De-
sist, Will Discuss New Solutions, DIGITAL TRENDS (June 20, 2014), http://www.digital-
trends.com/home/ikea-issues-cease-desist-order-long-running-fan-blog-
ikeahackers-net/ [https://perma.cc/XSD6-VLNU].
12. See Yap, supra note 7.
13. See Cory Doctorow, Ikea Bullies Ikeahackers with Bogus Trademark Claim, BO-
INGBOING (June 15, 2014, 10:26 AM), https://boingboing.net/2014/06/15/ikea-
bullies-ikeahackers-with.html [https://perma.cc/N4G8-PLH5]; see also Kelsey
Campbell-Dollaghan, Why Ikea Shutting Down Its Most Popular Fan Site Is a Giant
Mistake, GIZMODO (June 16, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://gizmodo.com/why-ikea-shut
ting-down-its-most-popular-fan-site-is-a-g-1591401344 [https://perma.cc/4XEW-
LCZ6]; Jennifer Karmon, After Global Outcry, IKEA Softens Stance Against Superfan,
YAHOO! HOMES (June 18, 2014, 5:15 PM), https://homes.yahoo.com/blogs/spaces
/ikea-threatens-legal-action-against-ikea-fan-s-8-year-old-site-230646533.html?nf=1
[https://perma.cc/82TS-7KG3].
14. See Jules Yap, Inter IKEA Systems BV Called Me!, IKEAHACKERS (June 19,
2014), http://www.ikeahackers.net/2014/06/inter-ikea-systems-bv-called-me.html
[http://perma.cc/Q89K-ZMBJ] (discussing IKEA’s withdrawal).
15. See generally Roger Katz, 2015 Will Be the Year of the Brand Community—Here’s
Why, CLICKZ (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/2391666/
2015-will-be-the-year-of-the-brand-community-here-s-why [https://perma.cc/
5UKU-L6F4]; see also Kerry O’Shea Gorgone, Why Brand Communities Are the Future
of Marketing: Jordan Kretchmer of Livefyre on Marketing Smarts [Podcast], MARKETING
PROFS (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.marketingprofs.com/podcasts/2015/27071/
brand-communities-jordan-kretchmer-marketing-smarts [http://perma.cc/XF7R-
WF64].
16. See Yap, supra note 7.
17. See Steve Baird, Minnesota’s Legislative Answer to “Trademark Bullying”?,
DUETSBLOG (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.duetsblog.com/2012/04/articles/trade-
marks/minnesotas-legislative-answer-to-trademark-bullying/ [http://perma.cc/
3T46-LF5A]; see also Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L.
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in the press for their aggressive responses to minor trademark infringe-
ments, it can be hard to understand why they would want to threaten their
own fans publicly.18  However, such actions are a result of the uneasy way
in which brands have been shoehorned into trademark law.  This Article
argues that brands contain expressive, creative content, and this creative
content encourages a response by consumer fans.  As such, brands would
be better served under a copyright regime.  Brand fan activities and brand
communities are very similar to the fanfiction and fanfiction communities
created in connection with works protected under copyright.  Whether
they love fanfiction or hate it, copyright owners are supported by copy-
right law.  They can stop fanfiction by challenging it as an unlicensed de-
rivative work, or they can ignore it and remain confident that their
copyright remains unscathed.  “Super fans” can also structure their activi-
ties to attempt to fall under the infringement protection of copyright fair
use.
Trademark law does not offer this freedom.  Trademark law has ex-
panded over the past several decades to provide increasing protection for
trademark owners and few avenues for expressive uses of trademarks by
non-owners.  A brand-theory approach to trademark law can account for
this expansion by acknowledging the substantial investment that trade-
mark owners make in developing a brand.19  However, that is only half of
the brand story.  Modern branding invites consumer involvement, and
marketing literature suggests that brand communities are the future of
advertising.  Trademark law’s focus on the brand owner apart from the
consumer ignores this push for consumer involvement in branding.  Be-
cause of this disconnect, trademark law requirements are ill-suited to ad-
dress brand development, and this Article advocates for a copyright-
centered approach to brands.  Brands are creative works deserving of
copyright protection.  The boundaries of copyright and the discretion
granted to copyright owners better address the reality of consumer in-
volvement in the creation of derivative brand works.
REV. 625, 642; Jessica M. Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of
Uncertainty in Trademark Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 218
(2014) (describing instance in which company was “shamed” via social media for
alleged trademark bullying).
18. See Timothy Geigner, Water Company Goes Trademark Bully on Graffiti Activ-
ists over Hashtag, TECHDIRT (May 14, 2015, 1:44 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20150511/13595230964/water-company-goes-trademar-bully-graffiti-activ
ists-over-hashtag.shtml [https://perma.cc/KHK7-MZSG] (discussing bullying by
the water company); Trevor Little, Monster Energy Company Heads Trademark Bullies
Top 10, but List Is Not All It Seems, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (May 27, 2015), http://
www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Blog/detail.aspx?g=7a58f3aa-6f8a-4f54-a544-c04b
76539d57 [https://perma.cc/N5CV-2MZZ] (listing top ten trademark bullies and
victims for 2014).
19. See generally Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981
(2012) [hereinafter Desai, From Trademarks to Brands] (describing brand-centered
approach to trademark law).
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Part I of this Article explains the theoretical justifications underlying
both copyright and trademark law and the evolution of trademark law
over the twentieth century.  Part II provides background regarding mar-
keting research on branding, as well as how brand theory can explain the
expansion of trademark law as it has attempted to recognize the substan-
tial investments made by trademark owners engaged in branding.  It also
explores the ways in which trademark law conflicts with the goals of brand
owners in their brand development efforts, as well as the current gap in
trademark scholarship regarding the role of the consumer in the develop-
ment of brands.  Part III explores the similarities between brands and
copyrightable works and discusses how brands may be better viewed under
copyright law as something akin to creative works and their derivative
fanfiction.
I. FOUNDATIONS FOR PROTECTION
In order to understand why fan activity is treated differently under
copyright law and trademark law, it is crucial to trace the theoretical basis
and historical development of each legal framework.  While trademark law
has long focused on the protection of consumers while denying explicit
property rights in trademarks to their owners, copyright law began and
continues as a protection granted to the copyright owner.
A. Copyright Protection
Federal copyright law in the United States stems from Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the United States Constitution, which states that “[t]he Congress
shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”20  In The Trade–Mark Cases,21
the United States Supreme Court defined the terms authors and writings as
they pertained to the constitutional scope of copyright protection; for a
work to receive copyright protection as a “writing” created by an “author,”
the Court determined that “originality is required.”22  It is the originality
that justifies the monopolistic rights authorized under copyright law:
“[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to
include original designs for engravings, prints, [etc.], it is only such as are
original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind.”23
Therefore, original and creative works are rewarded with copyright
protection, but courts have clarified that “[t]he copyright law, like the pat-
ent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”24
While the rights conferred by copyright are to be measured and balanced
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
22. See id. at 94.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
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by Congress to “assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return
for their labors,”25 the true focus of the constitutional mandate establish-
ing a federal copyright law is distributing original, creative works to the
public.  In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,26 the Supreme Court stated
that:
[T]he limited grant [under copyright law] is a means by which
an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the pro-
vision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive con-
trol has expired.27
In the broadest sense, copyright law aims to create an environment of ex-
pansion and creativity for the benefit of the consumer by using limited
copyright ownership as an incentive for creators.
B. Trademark Protection
Whereas inventors and authors receive patent and copyright protec-
tion in order to reward and encourage their contributions to the progress
of “Science and [the] useful Arts,”28 trademark owners are individuals or
businesses seeking protection for commercial activities, a seemingly less
noble pursuit.  Jurists and scholars have long distinguished trademarks
from the creativity associated with patents and copyrights by suggesting
that trademarks are mere menial symbols that do not “depend upon nov-
elty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain” and that require “no
fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.”29  Perhaps due to
this perceived divide between the banal commercial world of trademarks
and the creativity and innovation ascribed to works protected by copy-
rights and patents, trademarks have been described as “the overlooked
stepchild of the world of intellectual property goods.”30  Trademarks are
seen as a tool of commerce, and their protection is typically explained in
terms of economic efficiency.31  A trademark is a word or symbol used “to
identify and distinguish” the goods or services of a person from those of
another.32  J. Thomas McCarthy has identified four primary functions of
trademarks that justify their legal protection:
25. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546
(1985) (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
26. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
27. Id. at 429.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
29. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
30. See Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1613
(2010).
31. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167–68 (2003).
32. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining trademark); see also
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:1
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(1) To identify one seller’s goods and distinguish them from
goods sold by others;
(2) To signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from
or are controlled by a single, albeit anonymous, source;
(3) To signify that all goods bearing the trademark are of an
equal level of quality; and
(4) As a prime instrument in advertising and selling the goods.33
A trademark serving these purposes will be protected “against confusingly
similar commercial use.”34
Scholars and jurists have long argued that trademark protection is
essential to the marketplace; trademarks reduce consumer search costs be-
cause buyers and sellers can use trademarks as shorthand to refer to the
source and consistent quality of goods and services.35  For example, imag-
ine a consumer looking to buy running shoes for the first time.  That con-
sumer may ask friends for recommendations and spend time reading
reviews of the various running shoes available before deciding to purchase
a pair of shoes sold under the NEW BALANCE trademark.  If the con-
sumer is pleased with the fit and quality of the shoes, the consumer may
then seek out another pair of shoes sold under the NEW BALANCE mark
in the future without having to incur the same research or search costs
inherent in the initial purchase.  It has been argued that the use of trade-
marks “makes effective competition possible in a complex, impersonal
marketplace by providing a means through which the consumer can iden-
tify products which please him and reward the producer with continued
patronage.”36  Trademark law accomplishes this task by preventing busi-
nesses from using marks that are likely to confuse consumers about the
source of the goods or services being offered.
The likelihood of confusion test is the “basic test of both common-law
trademark infringement and federal statutory trademark infringement.”37
When evaluating whether a defendant has infringed the plaintiff’s trade-
mark under the Lanham Act (also known as the Trademark Act of 1946),
the court must ask whether the defendant’s use is “likely to cause confu-
(4th ed. 1998 & Supp. 2015).  For the purposes of this Article, the words mark and
trademark will be used interchangeably to refer to all forms of marks, registered or
not, including service marks, collective marks, and certification marks.  It is not
necessary to highlight the distinctions between types of marks for the analysis
herein.
33. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 3:2 (footnotes omitted).
34. Id.
35. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 31, at 167–68.  However, other justifica-
tions have been proposed. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007) (arguing that trademark law
historically focused on preventing trade diversion).
36. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968).
37. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 23:1 (footnote omitted).
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sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .”38  Confusion is more ambigu-
ous than one might expect, and this ambiguity has opened the door to a
wide variety of infringement suits.
C. The Historical Development of Trademark Law
Trademark cases in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were
interested in consumer confusion, as it was evidence of fraudulent intent
on the part of the defendant.39  At that time, the primary concern of
trademark law was the unfair competitive practice of “passing off,” which
consisted of the “sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those
of another.”40  The Supreme Court illustrated this focus in 1918 in United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,41 when it explained that a trademark’s
“function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular
trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another’s product as
his.”42  The Court noted the lack of bad faith on the part of the defendant
in this case, where the two parties simultaneously used the same mark in
different locations prior to an overlap in markets that led the plaintiff to
bring suit.43
This fraudulent intent was de-emphasized over time, and the atten-
tion was “shifted from the state of mind of the defendant to the state of
mind of buyers.”44  This shift of focus from the defendant to the consumer
may have paved the way for the modern expansion of trademark
law—which now allows redress for noncompetitive uses of a mark and
other less traditional claims—including dilution, sponsorship confusion,
38. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); see also Lanham Act
§ 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
39. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 827, 840 (2004) (discussing historical shift from focus on conduct of plain-
tiffs to evidence of fraud on part of defendants).
40. See Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 546 (1891); see also
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947) (holding that in-
junction rather than damages is fair remedy for unfair competition given that
“there has been no showing of fraud or palming off”); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 419 (1916) (holding that owner of trademark used in spe-
cific geographical area only cannot enjoin good faith use of trademark by third
party in different area when consumers in each area are only aware of their re-
gional trademark as source of product), superseded by statute, Lanham Act (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), as stated in Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
41. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
42. See id. at 97.
43. See id. at 101.
44. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 5:2; see also, e.g., Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v.
Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 410 (2d Cir. 1917).  In this early case, which focused on
confusion, the court permitted the plaintiff to block the use of plaintiff’s trade-
mark in connection with a different type of good because the public might be
confused about a connection between the two.
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss1/2
2016] BRANDS AS COPYRIGHT 53
initial interest confusion, and post-sale confusion.45  Each new basis for
trademark infringement or dilution liability deviates from the traditional
notion of actionable confusion.  Mark McKenna has made a strong argu-
ment that “only confusion that affects purchasing decisions should be rele-
vant to trademark law.”46  However, courts now “routinely say that
trademark law targets ‘confusion of any kind.’”47  This broadened view of
confusion is still explained as a natural effect of focusing on trademarks as
search cost optimizers.48  McKenna argues, “Anything that can be charac-
terized in confusion-based terms seems to raise search costs, and if search
costs are the harm to be avoided, then anything that causes confusion
ought to be at least prima facie actionable.”49
For example, sponsorship confusion is premised on the idea that con-
sumers may be confused about whether a third-party product or service is
sponsored or endorsed by the trademark owner.50  A plaintiff may sue
based on this confusion about the relationship between the parties, even
where the relationship, or lack thereof, would have no impact on con-
sumer purchasing decisions.51  In initial interest confusion cases, the con-
sumer is temporarily confused when the consumer seeks out the plaintiff’s
good or service, only to find instead the good or service offered by the
defendant.52  In an initial interest scenario, if the consumer purchases the
45. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 137, 140 (2010) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s] (“[T]he
claim that consumers are injured by the defendant’s use of a mark in an unrelated
market is implausible except under specialized circumstances, circumstances that
trademark plaintiffs should have to prove.”).
46. See Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law,
98 VA. L. REV. 67, 83 (2012) [hereinafter McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making
Theory].
47. See id. at 69–70 (quoting Kos Pharm. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 711
(3d Cir. 2004)); see also id. at 70 n.6 (“The Act is now broad enough to cover the
use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any
kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply as to source of origin.” (quoting Kos
Pharm., 369 F.3d at 711) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
48. See id. at 79 (“Because the search costs narrative is bound up with con-
sumer confusion, this view of trademark law’s purpose has manifested itself prima-
rily in courts’ fetishizing confusion and feeling compelled to respond whenever
mark owners can characterize a defendant’s use in confusion-based terms.”).
49. See id. at 71 (discussing search costs and confusion-based theory of trade-
mark law).  McKenna argues that “courts should find trademark infringement only
when the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark creates a risk that consumers
will be deceived into buying goods or services they otherwise would not have or
refraining from buying what they otherwise would have.” Id. at 72.
50. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 23:8 (explaining sponsorship confu-
sion); see also, e.g., Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78
F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing relevant inquiry as whether golfer
would be confused about affiliation between two golf clubs using same trademark).
51. See Champions Golf Club, 78 F.3d at 1116.
52. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 23:6; see also, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns,
Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing
initial interest confusion); Elvis Presley Enters. Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204
(5th Cir. 1998) (noting initial interest confusion may unfairly get customers to
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defendant’s product instead of continuing to seek out the plaintiff’s prod-
uct, the consumer is not confused at the time of purchase.53  The confu-
sion is only brief and fleeting.  Post-sale confusion occurs when the
consumer purchases a product (such as a pair of jeans with pocket embel-
lishments designed to mimic those on a more expensive brand of jeans)
with full knowledge that the product was sold under the defendant’s trade-
mark and not that of the plaintiff.54  However, liability is premised on the
idea that third parties will see the products after the time of the sale (be-
ing used by the purchaser, for example) and potentially be confused
about the source of the good due to similarities between the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s trademark or trade dress.55  McKenna clarifies that in such
cases, where the potential confusion does not affect the purchasing deci-
sion, “we can think of the confusion as generating search costs only if we
think the mental act of wondering is the search cost.”56
The focus on reducing search costs cannot account for “unbranded”
advertisements like Procter & Gamble’s “Thank You, Mom” campaign,
which celebrated the role of mothers without explicitly referencing the
company’s branded products.57  The purpose of this kind of marketing is
to deliberately increase search costs, a tactic that seems incomprehensible
under traditional trademark dogma.  Perhaps trademark law’s focus on
enter defendant’s bar and stay even though customers realize upon entering that
bar is not affiliated with Elvis Presley Enterprises).
53. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 23:6 (defining initial interest confusion).
54. See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (recognizing post-sale con-
fusion for first time); see also United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1352
(11th Cir. 1987) (discussing applicability of likelihood of confusion test in post-sale
context); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 493 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (“The fact that an immediate buyer of a $25 counterfeit watch does not
entertain any notions that it is the real thing has no place in this analysis.  Once a
product is injected into commerce, there is no bar to confusion, mistake, or decep-
tion occurring at some future point in time.”).
55. See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co., 221 F.2d at 466 (“This goes to show at
least that some customers would buy plaintiff’s cheaper clock for the purpose of
acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers’
homes would regard as a prestigious article.”).
56. See McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 46, at 84.  McK-
enna goes on to argue, “After all, trademark law regulates the commercial market-
place; it is not an all-purpose remedy for having to think.  There are, of course,
sometimes costs associated with being confused more generally, but these costs do
not harm consumers as consumers if they do not affect purchasing behavior.” See
id. at 85 (footnote omitted); see also Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trade-
mark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 441 (2011) (“Name or trademark changes that make it
more difficult for others to retrieve information about the person or entity are not
legally prohibited, even though such changes can result in increased search costs,
and even though others may have been induced to act in a way in which they
would not have acted if they had known about the person’s or the company’s
history.”).
57. See Jay Bolling, Take the Brand Out of the “Branded vs. Unbranded” Conversa-
tion, PM360 (June 16, 2014), http://www.pm360online.com/take-the-brand-out-of-
the-branded-vs-unbranded-conversation/ [https://perma.cc/7B5R-HFT8].
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search costs obscures instances in which consumers and trademark owners
benefit from increased search cost.  In fact, others have noted that “[f]ar
from harming a brand by increasing search costs, practices that require
consumers to exert cognitive effort benefit brands by more actively engag-
ing consumers.”58  This paradoxical effect cannot be explained by tradi-
tional trademark doctrine, but the paradox is resolved if trademarks are
treated as brands and analyzed through the lens of brand theory.
II. BRANDS AS TRADEMARKS
As trademark law has expanded, the role of trademarks for businesses
has also changed and evolved.  Trademarks now add substantial value to
companies as stand-alone assets.  For example, Forbes recently named
Google as the most valuable trademark, with a value estimated at $44.3
billion.59  AT&T came in as the tenth most valuable mark, with a value of
$28.9 billion.60  Such value is due in part to the increasing roles that adver-
tising and marketing play in both creating consumer-source associations
and creating the need or desire for a particular good or service in the
mind of consumers.  As Laura Heymann has explained, “[w]ith the devel-
opment of advertising techniques starting in the 1920s, trademarks moved
from functioning primarily at the point of sale (i.e., as a heuristic for re-
peat customers) to having a psychological effect on consumers well before
the consummation of any actual sale and a lingering effect thereafter.”61
This shift in the importance of advertising and the function of trademarks
corresponds to a shift in focus from trademarks to brands (of which trade-
marks are only components of a larger whole).
While a trademark can be described as a symbolic indicator of the
source or quality of a product, the product’s brand includes both the
trademark and all the other information about the product presented to
the marketplace by the trademark owner, including the product’s packag-
ing and the various forms of marketing materials produced to sell the
product.62  Stephen King, the former Director of WPP Group, the world’s
largest communications and marketing services company, once remarked:
58. See McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 46, at 91.
59. See The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/pic
tures/eidl45jl/google/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
60. See id.
61. See Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First
Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 695 (2009).
62. However, some marketing theorists are so focused on the importance of
the brand that they conflate the brand with the trademark. See, e.g., DAVID A.
AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY: CAPITALIZING ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND NAME 7
(1991) (“A brand is a distinguishing name and/or symbol . . . intended to identify
the goods or services of either one seller or a group of sellers, and to differentiate
those goods or services from those of competitors.  A brand thus signals to the
customer the source of the product, and protects both the customer and the pro-
ducer from competitors who would attempt to provide products that appear to be
identical.”).
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“A product is something that is made in a factory; a brand is something
that is bought by a customer.  A product can be copied by a competitor; a
brand is unique.  A product can be quickly outdated; a successful brand is
timeless.”63  A product new to the market will likely be sold under a trade-
mark that fits the traditional role of such a mark; it indicates the source of
the product.  If the trademark for the new product is inherently distinc-
tive, the trademark will receive legal protection absent any secondary
meaning (or time-developed, consumer knowledge of the source of the
product) in the marketplace.
However, that new product will not yet possess a brand identity.  Fa-
mous brands possess numerous markers of identity that contribute to the
overall brand image—including trademarked names (COCA COLA, HAR-
LEY DAVIDSON), logos (the NIKE swoosh, the NBC peacock), and trade
dress (the COCA COLA bottle shape, the round shape of a MOBIL gas
pump)—but they also possess a story or history that has been shared with
consumers.  Douglas Holt explains:
A brand emerges as various “authors” tell stories that involve
the brand.  Four primary types of authors are involved: compa-
nies, the culture industries, intermediaries (such as critics and
retail salespeople), and customers (particularly when they form
communities). . . .
Brand stories have plots and characters, and they rely heavily
on metaphor to communicate and to spur our imaginations.  As
these stories collide in everyday social life, conventions eventually
form. . . .  A brand emerges when these collective understandings
become firmly established.64
This brand “story” is developed first by the brand owner and its mar-
keting efforts.  In developing this story, the marketing team is likely creat-
ing a brand strategy for how the various branding efforts will be released
to the consumer: through print advertisements, radio or television com-
mercials, or even a viral or online campaign.65  The first interactions that
consumers have with a new product will likely occur either at a store when
63. See id. at 1.
64. DOUGLAS B. HOLT, HOW BRANDS BECOME ICONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF CUL-
TURAL BRANDING 3 (2004).
65. Viral marketing or viral branding is a modern marketing tactic whereby
consumers are invited to assist in spreading a marketing message (with the hope
that it will spread from consumer to consumer like a “virus”).  Viral campaigns can
be beneficial in that they appear to have more authenticity and excitement for
consumers.  However, brand owners run the risk that the campaign will veer off in
an unintended or negative direction since the brand owner is ceding significant
control to consumers. See TILDE HEDING, CHARLOTTE F. KNUDTZEN & MOGENS
BJERRE, BRAND MANAGEMENT: RESEARCH, THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (2009).
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the consumer is contemplating a purchase or through print or television
marketing.66
The modern approach to branding is to think of and describe the
brand as if it were a person.67  Therefore, a brand can have a personality,
which is typically described as the psychological personality characteristics
ascribed to a brand by consumers.68  By conducting focus groups, brand
owners can uncover the brand personality perceived by consumers and
explore the personality characteristics that would cause such consumers to
become more personally engaged with the brand.69  The goal is to then
further develop marketing efforts that imbue the brand with these sought-
after personality traits.
Brands are also described as having an identity.70  This is “a set of
associations the brand strategist seek[s] to create or maintain” in the mind
of the consumer.71  In essence, the brand identity includes the brand per-
sonality, but it also must be a more long-lasting and permanent sense of
the vision and uniqueness of the brand so that it serves as the “driver of all
brand-related activities.”72  Marketing teams are tasked with the goal of
developing a brand identity and communicating it to consumers through
various types of marketing campaigns and forms of advertising.
Developing a new brand can be a very expensive undertaking.  How-
ever, this expense is essential, as brand positioning and advertising are
seen as “[t]he most significant contributor to the development of a brand,
beyond the product itself (in the splendor of all of its tangible and intangi-
ble elements) . . . .”73  In 2013, for example, Unilever spent $195 million
on U.S. advertising for its DOVE line of soaps, body washes, and hair care
products.74  However, in 2002, it allegedly spent $110 million alone on the
66. See Alexander L. Biel, Converting Image into Equity, in BRAND EQUITY & AD-
VERTISING: ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 67, 74 (David A. Aaker
& Alexander L. Biel eds., 1993) (“In addition to direct and indirect (e.g., word of
mouth, media reports, etc.) personal experience with a brand, media advertising is
an obvious source of [brand] image, both reflecting and forming the brand’s
gestalt.”).
67. See Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 84 (2010) (arguing
that “trademark law should serve to discourage brand fetishism, and should act to
restore the original informative function of trademarks”).
68. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 65, at 117–19 (describing brand personality
approach).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 12 (describing formation of brand identity).
71. See id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. See id. at 13.
73. See RICHARD D. CZERNIAWSKI & MICHAEL W. MALONEY, CREATING BRAND
LOYALTY: THE MANAGEMENT OF POWER POSITIONING AND REALLY GREAT ADVERTISING
8 (1999); see also HOLT, supra note 64, at 7 (“Most iconic brands have been built
through the mass media, usually with television advertising.”).
74. See Alexandra Bruell, Unilever to Review Massive Media Buying and Planning
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marketing launch of its new line of DOVE hair care products.75  Market-
ing executives and researchers agree that advertising is a necessary
expense:
Advertising . . . is a critically essential plank for establishing in the
minds of your customers how and what to think about your offer-
ing in the absolute and relative to other products in the market-
place.  Advertising contributes to the development and
establishment of the brand.  Really great advertising helps estab-
lish great brands and, of course, brand loyalty.76
In spite of the cost of developing a brand, a company benefits greatly
from the brand equity that is produced.  While the monetary value of
trademark assets has been said to encompass the “goodwill” of a business,
it may be more accurate to say that it is a shorthand reference for all of the
value contained within the relevant brand.  This is the brand equity:
“[T]he value, usually defined in economic terms, of a brand beyond the
physical assets associated with its manufacture or provision.”77  Possessing
a well-developed and well-known brand name translates into numerous
benefits to the brand owner, including the ability to spend less money
introducing new product extensions.78  Established brands have also been
found to be more immune to competitor price fluctuations and promo-
tions: “Brand loyalty, long a central construct in marketing, is a measure of
the attachment that a customer has to a brand. . . .  As brand loyalty in-
creases, the vulnerability of the customer base to competitive action is
reduced.”79
Brand loyalty is especially important to companies now that there is
significantly more competition and significantly more products and ser-
vices than ever before.  Marketers routinely use price promotions and sales
to encourage fickle customers to try the next new product in a category.
To combat this competitive environment, companies must either enter
into this battle of price promotions or develop brand loyalty.80  The varied
benefits stemming from solid brand development are recognized in
75. See Dove: Brand Profile, ADBRANDS.NET, http://www.adbrands.net/us/dove_
us.htm [https://perma.cc/NLS6-BB9J] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
76. CZERNIAWSKI & MALONEY, supra note 73, at 9.
77. See Biel, supra note 66, at 69.
78. See Rajeev Batra, Donald R. Lehmann & Dipinder Singh, The Brand Person-
ality Component of Brand Goodwill: Some Antecedents and Consequences, in BRAND EQ-
UITY & ADVERTISING: ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING STRONG BRANDS, supra note
66, at 83, 83 (“Brand names are regarded among the most valuable assets owned by
a company.  A well-known and well-regarded brand name—one with a high level of
equity or goodwill—can often be extended into new product categories, in a way that
saves the extending company many of the expenses of establishing a new brand
name.  As a consequence, companies acquiring others pay significant asset valua-
tion premiums for the portfolio of brand names that are acquired.” (emphasis
added) (citation omitted)).
79. See AAKER, supra note 62, at 39.
80. See CZERNIAWSKI & MALONEY, supra note 73, at xix.
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merger and acquisition scenarios, whereby investors and purchasers will
pay a premium that reflects brand equity.81  Currently, Forbes ranks Apple
as the most powerful brand: it is valued at $145.3 billion.82  Apple’s yearly
advertising spending of $1.2 billion was significantly less than the $4 bil-
lion spent by Samsung (ranked as the seventh most powerful brand by
Forbes), which demonstrates the financial impact of brand loyalty since
Apple is said to “rel[y] on its avid fan base more than Madison Avenue to
promote its products.”83
A. Brands and Marketing Theory
Marketing scholars began studying brands in earnest in the 1990s,
drawing on a variety of scientific disciplines, including economics, con-
sumer research, organizational behavior, psychology, sociology, and an-
thropology.84  The earliest brand research was based on economic theory
and studied brands with the goal of determining how to optimize sales.
Under this approach, it was believed that optimal sales would result from
the correct marketing mix of the “Four Ps”: price, product, place, and
promotion.85  The goal of a brand manager was to study economic theory
to determine the proper balance of costs and revenue related to these four
factors.  In this model of branding, consumers played a passive role and
were assumed to simply receive marketing messages and then respond in a
rational fashion to those messages in determining whether to buy the rele-
vant product at the set price point.86
Subsequent research recognized that consumers are not always so pas-
sive or so rational in making purchasing decisions.  The economic ap-
proach struggled to explain why a consumer may pay a higher price for a
brand name product when there is an equivalent, cheaper product sold
next to it on the same shelf in the grocery store.  Therefore, the next wave
of branding research focused more on the relationship between the con-
sumer and the brand.
As part of this focus on the consumer, brand identity became an es-
sential focus, and it included both an understanding of consumer percep-
tions of the brand owner (or corporate identity) as well as an analysis of
81. See David A. Aaker & Alexander L. Biel, Brand Equity and Advertising: An
Overview, in BRAND EQUITY & ADVERTISING: ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING
STRONG BRANDS, supra note 66, at 1, 1 (“Philip Morris purchased Kraft for more
than six times its book value.  In his 1989 keynote address to the Advertising Re-
search Foundation, Hamish Maxwell, the man behind the acquisition, emphasized
that he was buying strong brands.”).
82. See The World’s Most Valuable Brands, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/pow-
erful-brands/list/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
83. See Kurt Badenhausen, Apple and Microsoft Head the World’s Most Valuable
Brands 2015, FORBES (May 13, 2015, 9:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurt
badenhausen/2015/05/13/apple-and-microsoft-head-the-worlds-most-valuable-
brands-2015/.
84. See HEDING ET AL., supra note 65, at 4.
85. See id. at 37.
86. See id. at 31.
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how consumers are personifying the brand (and developing its perceived
brand personality).87  To study this dyadic relationship between brand
and consumer, researchers began to use both quantitative and qualitative
techniques, which added detailed interviews and home studies to the tradi-
tional use of consumer surveys and quantitative focus group testing.88
The underlying assumption is that a strong and well-developed brand per-
sonality can help to increase consumer attachment to a brand.89  In order
to create this strong personality and brand identity, brand owners must
engage with consumers in an ongoing discourse to determine how the
brand is perceived.90  The brand owner is then able to change its market-
ing message in order to change consumer perceptions in a manner that
will increase sales and consumer loyalty.91
Recent research into brand communities takes the brand–consumer
relationship a step further by also incorporating the relationship between
consumers.92  Focus is now on the “brand triad.”93  This approach recog-
nizes that other consumers can impact how a single consumer views a
brand; consumers receive official messages from brand owners, as well as
numerous unofficial messages about the brand from other consumers.94
As discussed in more detail below, this is a more complex view of branding
that is heralded as providing insights into the future of branding, and a
robust theory of trademark law should be able to account for it.
B. A Brand Theory of Trademark Law
In order to better understand modern trademark law’s evolution and
expansion, trademark law must be viewed through brand theory.  Accord-
ing to Deven Desai in his foundational work explaining the brand theory
approach to trademark law, “trademarks have moved far beyond the com-
mercial sphere.  Trademarks have become brands; that is, they now are
more about allowing corporations to protect reputation and persona than
preventing unfair competition and advancing consumer protection.”95
While this statement reflects the new role of the brand as a reputational
asset to a corporation, the brand encompasses more than just product or
corporate reputation.  Desai continues elsewhere:
The noncorporate dimension of branding involves consum-
ers and communities as stakeholders in brands.  Consumers
87. See id. at 23.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 118.
90. See id. at 118–20.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 182.
93. See id. at 183.
94. See id. at 182–85.
95. See Deven R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure
Doctrine, 98 MINN. L. REV. 455, 475 (2013) [hereinafter Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and
the Market].
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often buy branded goods not for their quality but as badges of
loyalty, ways to express identity, and items to alter and interpret
for self-expression.  Some consumers form brand communities
which either evangelize or police brand meaning and corporate
practices.  From the perspective of trademark law, this behavior
presents a problem; from the perspective of brand scholarship, it
is both ordinary and expected.96
When trademark law is analyzed using brand theory, two things be-
come clear.  First, brand theory helps to explain the expansion of trade-
mark law with regard to initial-interest confusion, post-sale confusion, and
dilution.  By widening one’s understanding of trademarks from simple
symbols for source differentiation to components of a larger brand, one
can better understand the creation of these causes of action and their logi-
cal boundaries.  Second, brand theory also highlights a current weakness
in trademark law with regard to its view of the role of consumers:
“[T]rademark law champions corporations as the sole custodians of trade-
mark meaning. . . .  Trademark law thus clings to the model of the firm as
the one with the exclusive power to develop the brand and to control its
meaning.”97  Instead, trademark law must recognize the active role that
consumers now play in the development of brands.  In doing so, it will
need to allow for more interplay between the trademark owner and the
consumer in order to accurately reflect modern marketing reality.
C. Brand Theory and Trademark Expansion
Viewing trademarks through the lens of brand theory, initial-interest
confusion, post-sale confusion, and dilution can be conceptualized as de-
velopments that assist trademark owners in protecting their brand.  Rather
than simply preventing source confusion or reducing consumer search
costs, these causes of action recognize the investments being made by
trademark owners in the larger notion of the trademark-affiliated brand.
For example, initial-interest confusion has been maligned by some com-
mentators because it allows an action for infringement when the con-
sumer is not actually confused at the time of the purchase of the good or
service.98  Initial-interest confusion is said to occur, for example, when a
consumer is drawn to a store by advertisements for a well-known trade-
marked good.  Upon arriving at the store, the trademarked good is not
available, so the consumer decides to buy a competitor’s product instead.
96. See Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, supra note 19, at 986 (footnotes
omitted).
97. See id. at 983–84.
98. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademarks and the Internet: The United States’
Experience, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 931, 936 (2007) (arguing against initial-interest con-
fusion as “muddle[d]” over-expansion of trademark law); Jennifer E. Rothman,
Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 105 (2005) (arguing for “pre-sale confusion” instead of initial-interest
confusion).
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The consumer may have been misled about the availability of the trade-
marked good (and may have incurred some transaction costs in seeking
out this particular store), but the consumer is not mistaken about the
source of the product purchased.  The consumer has the option of leaving
the store but opts to buy the competitor’s product instead.
Under some circumstances, courts have permitted trademark owners
to obtain damages for trademark infringement based solely on this initial
pre-sale confusion.99  However, a brand-centric view of trademark law rec-
ognizes that initial-interest confusion is a form of unfair competition that
can directly harm the truthful advertising efforts of the trademark owner.
Substantial investment in truthful advertising is necessary to the develop-
ment of an iconic brand.  As such, initial-interest confusion can be seen as
addressing a commercial injury to that brand investment.100
Post-sale confusion, on the other hand, occurs when a consumer buys
counterfeit merchandise.  Even though the consumer is aware of the fact
that the item is counterfeit and therefore is not confused as to the source
of the good, courts have found infringement in post-sale confusion cases
based on the fact that third parties unconnected to the actual sale may
mistakenly believe that the item is a genuine, trademarked good.101  As
such, the trademark owner may be harmed by the mental association of
the potentially inferior counterfeit good with the trademark, thereby les-
sening the perceived prestige of the trademark and its genuinely affiliated
goods.  Again, the actual consumer in such a scenario was not confused
about the source of the good, so this cause of action does not reflect the
original underpinnings of trademark law.  Liability for post-sale confusion
does not prevent consumer confusion or reduce consumer search costs.
However, it does support branding efforts.  By allowing trademark owners
to sue for such counterfeiting where direct consumers are not confused,
courts are again supporting the investment of business owners in the
larger concept of a brand.102
Dilution might be the most criticized of the recent expansions of
trademark law.103  It has been called “a fundamental shift in the nature of
99. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Sixth, the use of the Cat’s stove-pipe hat or the confusingly
similar title to capture initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale is
finally completed as a result of the confusion, may be still an infringement.”); Mo-
bil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987) (“As
explained above, the district court’s concerns focused upon the probability that
potential purchasers would be misled into an initial interest in Pegasus Petroleum.
Such initial confusion works a sufficient trademark injury.”).
100. See Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, supra note 19, at 1025 (“[T]he [ini-
tial-interest confusion] doctrine has little to do with rational choice problems that
traditionally animate trademark law.”).
101. See supra note 54.
102. See Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, supra note 19, at 1025.
103. See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent
Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
117, 131 (2004) (“There is scant empirical evidence that multiple uses of a famous
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trademark protection”104 and may signal an expansion of trademark
rights at the expense of the public domain.105  Under the federal Trade-
mark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, the holder of a “famous mark”106 may
now bring a dilution claim against a junior user of a mark if the junior
user’s use is “likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment
of the famous mark . . . .”107  The statute expressly states that a dilution
claim may be brought “regardless of the presence or absence of actual or
likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.”108  Given
the broad nature of this cause of action, critics of dilution liability note
that “holders of famous marks can sue junior users even when the junior
user does not compete with the mark holder, there is no likelihood of
confusion, or there is no quantifiable economic harm.”109
These criticisms all highlight the underlying problem that dilution
law does not easily follow from a traditional, consumer-focused theory of
trademark protection.  Dilution is not about reducing search costs or in-
creasing the amount or quality of information available to consumers.  In-
stead, it is explicitly about protecting the trademark owner: “[D]ilution
law is producer-focused rather than consumer-focused: It seeks to prevent
diminution in the value of a famous mark stemming from the use of the
mark by someone other than the trademark holder.”110  Congress took a
brand view of trademarks when it drafted and passed this federal dilution
act; such focus can be clearly seen in Congress’s explanation that the law
was intended to protect “the substantial investment the owner has made in
the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself.”111  If
trademark law is reframed as a law of brand protection, dilution law be-
comes less incongruous.  Dilution law expressly protects the owners of fa-
mark dilute the selling power of the mark in connection with the first class of
products to which it was attached.”); Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution
Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709, 711
(2007) (arguing federal and state dilution states are unconstitutional restraints on
commercial speech); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Com-
mon Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner,
The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1295, 1305 (1998) (“Owners of ‘famous’ marks can use this statute to capture
the domain name they want, even if someone else got it first, but owners of non-
famous marks seem to be out of luck.”).
104. See Lemley, supra note 103, at 1698.
105. See Radin, supra note 103, at 1305.
106. A famous mark is statutorily defined as a mark that is “widely recognized
by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of
the goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012).
107. See id. § 1125(c)(1).
108. See id.
109. See Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law,
2010 BYU L. REV. 1425, 1459.
110. See Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2006)
(presenting empirical evidence of judicial dissatisfaction with dilution law).
111. See Desai & Waller, supra note 109, at 1460 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-
374, at 3 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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mous marks, and those famous marks became well-known enough to
justify this protection through the use of substantial branding tech-
niques.112  Therefore, dilution law encourages substantial investment in
branding and rewards those companies that have made such an invest-
ment by allowing them to safeguard their brand from the more subtle
blurring or tarnishment injuries that may be caused by non-competitors.
D. Brand Theory and Consumer Involvement
While brand theory can be used to better understand the legal shifts
in modern trademark law, it also highlights the fact that trademark law
turns a blind eye to the changing relationship between brands (and thus
trademarks) and consumers.  Traditionally, trademark law placed consum-
ers in the role of passive parties needing protection from confusing adver-
tising tactics.  The law’s focus on the likelihood of confusion highlights
this approach.  However, brand owners are increasingly asking consumers
to engage with their brands, including by participating in market research
to help develop boundaries on the brand’s perceived “personality,” as well
as by actively spreading marketing information through viral or word-of-
mouth campaigns.113  Noting this growing role for consumers in branding
efforts, Laura Heymann argues, “If trademark law recognized the active
work that consumers do in engaging with trademarks, it would incorpo-
rate a theory of the consumer that sees him as capable of engaging with
these trademark associations without the law’s interference.”114
While it is true that a brand concept is initially developed by the
brand owner and that initial communications regarding the brand will
come from that owner, consumers will have a variety of interactions with
and influence on that brand once the product and its brand image are
made public.  At the very least, the consumer must be recognized as some-
one who “not only perceives the trademark as a source identifier but who
also can call to mind (and then accept or reject) the various associations
the mark comprises.”115
112. See id. (“In other words, criticisms that dilution is far removed from
trademark law’s search-cost and consumer-focused foundations are accurate but
miss the point that trademark law has already imported a brand perspective into its
doctrine.  Dilution, like the other brand-based extensions of trademark law in re-
cent times, can be seen as merely the most obvious iteration of that view.”).
113. See, e.g., TOMI T. AHONEN & ALAN MOORE, COMMUNITIES DOMINATE
BRANDS: BUSINESS AND MARKETING CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 220–22
(2005) (citing examples of consumer involvement in marketing of Ford Escape
and Firefox web browsers); see also Luis V. Casalo´, Carlos Flavia´n & Miguel
Guinalı´u, Promoting Consumer’s Participation in Virtual Brand Communities: A New Par-
adigm in Branding Strategy, 14 J. MARKETING COMM. 19, 19–20 (2008) (“Indeed,
more and more firms are starting to use several online tools (e.g. chats, forums,
etc.) to contact their consumers and to allow interaction among them.”).
114. See Heymann, supra note 61, at 655.
115. See id. at 654.
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Deven Desai notes the many ways that a brand may be used by these
intersecting stakeholders:
A company uses brands to provide product information to con-
sumers, but it also uses brands to enhance the overall corporate
image as the company pursues a full range of business goals.
Consumers may, of course, use brands to find products.  But con-
sumers may simultaneously use brands as expressions of individu-
ality and identity as they take a brand and alter it to match what
they see as the meaning of the brand and how that meaning re-
lates to their self-image or message.  Communities may also en-
gage with a brand as a symbol about which they wish to comment
and share both positive and negative information.116
This connection between brands and consumers can be valuable for the
consumer as well as for the brand owner.
Some customers develop intense emotional connections with brands
and with the trademarks connected to those brands.  Douglas Holt has
conducted research on iconic brands and found that:
Customers value some products as much for what they symbolize
as for what they do.  For brands like Coke, Budweiser, Nike, and
Jack Daniel’s, customers value the brand’s stories largely for their
identity value.  Acting as vessels of self-expression, the brands are
imbued with stories that consumers find valuable in constructing
their identities.117
In this way, consumers find emotional and psychological value in asso-
ciating with certain brands.  Some consumers even join brand communi-
ties to further cement these connections within the larger community of
consumers.  A brand community is defined as “a specialized, non-geo-
graphically bound community, based on a structured set of social relation-
ships among admirers of a brand.”118  Frequently these communities form
online as virtual communities.119  Branded communities are unique when
compared to more traditional communities founded based on shared ge-
ography or shared affinities, because at the center of the community is a
116. See Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, supra note 19, at 988–89.
117. See HOLT, supra note 64, at 3.
118. See Albert M. Muniz, Jr. & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Brand Community, 27 J.
CONSUMER RES. 412, 412 (2001); see also Marcelo Royo-Vela & Paolo Casamassima,
The Influence of Belonging to Virtual Brand Communities on Consumers’ Affective Commit-
ment, Satisfaction and Word-of-Mouth Advertising: The ZARA Case, 35 ONLINE INFO.
REV. 517, 519 (2011).
119. See Royo-Vela & Casamassima, supra note 118, at 518 (“A virtual commu-
nity is defined as the integration of a group of individuals using the internet to
maintain social relations around a common interest.” (citation omitted)). See gen-
erally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELEC-
TRONIC FRONTIER (1993).
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branded good or service.120  However, the psychological factors that bring
the members together to form the community, the foundational princi-
ples required to identify such a group as a community, and the benefits
received by members121 are all consistent with other, more traditional
types of communities: “Like other communities, [a brand community] is
marked by a shared consciousness, rituals and traditions, and a sense of
moral responsibility.”122
The first indicator of community, “[c]onsciousness of kind[,] is the
intrinsic connection that members feel toward one another, and the col-
lective sense of difference from others not in the community.”123  It is a
shared sense of belonging.124  In their 2001 ethnographical study that laid
the foundation for modern brand community research, Albert Muniz Jr.
and Thomas O’Guinn investigated three brand communities through in-
terviews conducted with community members located in a Midwestern
town.125  They found evidence of all three community characteristics,
listed above, in the brand communities studied.126  With regard to con-
sciousness of kind, the investigators noted that community members felt a
strong connection to the brand but an even stronger connection to one
another.127  Members felt that they could describe other members without
having met them.128
This statement encompasses ideas of “legitimacy” and “oppositional
brand loyalty”—two ways in which members establish themselves as insid-
ers versus outsiders.129  In the brand community formed around Saab cars
in the study mentioned above, members felt that “legitimate” members
were ones who purchased the car for the right reasons: in appreciation of
the durability of the car.130  More recent purchasers, those who purchased
based on trends or current advertising, were not “making a long-term
commitment” and thus were deemed illegitimate.131  Additionally, opposi-
tional brand loyalty was one of the strongest ways in which community
members defined themselves.132  Members of the Macintosh computer
brand community were fervently opposed to Microsoft and its products.133
Community websites would frequently lambast and demonize Bill Gates
120. See Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 118, at 412.
121. See HOLT, supra note 64, at 4 (“Conventional branding models largely
ignore how brands buttress consumer identities.”).
122. See Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 118, at 412.
123. See id. at 413.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 415.
126. See id. at 426.
127. See id. at 418.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 419–20; see also HEDING ET AL., supra note 65, at 189.
130. See Muniz & O’Guinn, supra note 118, at 419.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 420.
133. See id.
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and Microsoft as evidence of the website developer’s (and the commu-
nity’s) dedication to the community’s core beliefs.134  If a community
member violates this oppositional brand loyalty by purchasing a compet-
ing product, the member’s legitimacy as part of the community will be
questioned.135
The second indicator of community is the existence of shared rituals
and traditions.  Rituals and traditions “perpetuate the community’s shared
history, culture, and consciousness.”136  Rituals also “help to reproduce
and transmit the community’s meaning in and outside of the commu-
nity.”137  The rituals in brand communities may be small undertakings,
such as honking or flashing one’s lights when a Saab brand community
member encounters another Saab driver on the road.138  However, these
are shared rituals, and they work to reinforce community values and
strengthen the consciousness of kind discussed above.139  Another com-
mon ritual among brand communities is repetitive story-telling regarding
the brand’s history or origin.  Saab brand community members were
found to often repeat the same basic origin story (focused on the fact that
Saab first developed airplanes) at both meetings and on the numerous
community-created websites.140  Members show evidence of their legiti-
macy by reciting the agreed-upon history of the brand, where such a story
may have been gleaned from the original community members or may
result from the brand owner’s own marketing efforts.141
The third and final indicator used to define a community is a per-
ceived sense of moral responsibility, which manifests as “a felt sense of
duty or obligation to the community as a whole, and to its individual mem-
bers.”142  A shared sense of moral responsibility helps communities to re-
cruit new members and retain current members.  In brand communities,
“[m]oral responsibility also includes looking out for and helping other
members in their consumption of the brand.”143  Members of the Saab
and Macintosh communities indicated that they felt a responsibility to
help other users of Macintosh computers or Saab cars—whether they were
current members or not—when their computer or car was malfunction-
ing.144  This responsibility included an obligation to share information
and resources related to the brand, such as details about newly released
134. See id.
135. See id. at 420–21.
136. See id. at 413.
137. See Royo-Vela & Casamassima, supra note 118, at 520.




142. See id. at 413.
143. See id. at 425.
144. See id.
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products or opinions regarding the best repair businesses.145  This moral
responsibility provides a virtually free way for companies to distribute in-
formation among customers and to encourage consumer engagement.
Moreover, marketing research indicates that companies should con-
sider setting up brand communities as a way to enhance consumers’ levels
of satisfaction and commitment to brands.146  In studies of brand commu-
nities, including online virtual brand communities, simply registering for
the community boosts consumer satisfaction, stated levels of affective com-
mitment to the brand, and the likelihood of positive word-of-mouth activi-
ties by the registered consumer.147  Active participation in the brand
community brings higher levels of satisfaction and commitment than
merely passive belonging.148  This is an especially exciting finding for
brand owners, as other studies have found that consumers are increasingly
likely to mistrust and dislike traditional forms of advertising.149  Perhaps
this research underlies the current enthusiasm among marketing profes-
sionals regarding brand communities, with some marketing websites call-
ing 2015 “the year of the brand community.”150
Numerous studies have shown that participation in a brand commu-
nity influences participants’ behaviors.  For example, members feel obli-
gated to disparage other similar products by competitors.151  Participation
increases consumer loyalty toward the brand around which the commu-
nity is developed, and that loyalty can result in a greater likelihood of re-
peat purchases for the brand owner.152  Additionally, a high level of
satisfaction stemming from brand community participation has been
shown to lead to an increase in the amount of positive word-of-mouth ad-
145. See id.
146. See Royo-Vela & Casamassima, supra note 118, at 538.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Michael Trusov, Randolph E. Bucklin & Koen Pauwels, Effects of Word-
of-Mouth Versus Traditional Marketing: Findings from an Internet Social Networking Site,
73 J. MARKETING 90, 90 (2009) (noting that, when comparing surveys of consumer
perceptions from 2002 to 2004, “40% fewer people agree that advertisements are a
good way to learn about new products, 59% fewer people report that they buy
products because of their advertisements, and 49% fewer people find that adver-
tisements are entertaining”).
150. Katz, supra note 15; see also Kerry O’Shea Gorgone, Why Brand Communi-
ties Are the Future of Marketing: Jordan Kretchmer of Livefyre on Marketing Smarts [Pod-
cast], supra note 15.
151. See John W. Schouten & James H. McAlexander, Subcultures of Consump-
tion: An Ethnography of the New Bikers, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 43, 53 (1995) (noting
that community of Harley-Davidson owners bond over shared sense of heritage or
tradition that leads to criticism of Japanese motorcycles because of “perceived dis-
dain of Japanese manufacturers for tradition, as demonstrated by the frequent in-
troduction of new models and the extinction of others after only a few years.
Harley-Davidson, in contrast, emphasizes a continuity that connects its newest mo-
torcycle in a direct line of ancestry to its earliest prototype”).
152. See Casalo´ et al., supra note 113, at 31; see also Royo-Vela & Casamassima,
supra note 118, at 520.
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vertising that is shared by community members about the product or com-
pany.153  Word-of-mouth (WOM) advertising has been shown to be more
effective at persuading purchasers and to have a significant positive effect
on post-purchase product perceptions.154  Overall, word-of-mouth com-
munication among brand community members has been found to be
much more effective than traditional advertising activities in stimulating
sales.155
Additionally, some research suggests that brand owners would receive
more of the benefits described above if they allowed consumers to develop
their own brand communities independent of the brand owner.  Past con-
sumer behavior research suggests that consumers tend to view corpora-
tions’ marketing strategies (including corporate-sponsored brand
community development) in a cynical fashion and assign exploitative mo-
tivation to even purely altruistic promotions.156  However, research has
also shown that consumer-created online brand communities engender
higher intrinsic motives of altruism than a similar marketer-created online
brand community.157  By allowing consumer-created brand communities
to develop and flourish, brand owners can receive numerous benefits with-
out suffering from the negative connotations consumers ascribe to tradi-
tional, corporate-generated marketing.158
E. The Trademark–Brand Disconnect
If consumer-initiated branding is as beneficial to brand owners as the
marketing research suggests, it seems incongruous that brand owners like
IKEA would take actions to stop it.  However, trademark law contains en-
153. See Trusov et al., supra note 149, at 90; see also A´ngel Milla´n & Estrella
Dı´az, Analysis of Consumers’ Response to Brand Community Integration and Brand Identi-
fication, 21 J. BRAND MGMT. 254, 255 (2014).
154. See Royo-Vela & Casamassima, supra note 118, at 522.
155. See, e.g., Trusov et al., supra note 149, at 91 (“[W]e find that WOM refer-
rals strongly affect new customer acquisitions and have significantly longer carry-
over than traditional forms of marketing used by the firm (21 days versus 3 to 7
days).  We estimate a long-term elasticity for WOM of .53—approximately 20–30
times higher than the elasticities for traditional marketing.”); see also id. at 95–96
(“[T]he WOM effect on sign-ups remains significantly different from zero for ap-
proximately three weeks.  In contrast, the effects of media and events . . . lose
significance within just a few days.  Compared with traditional marketing activities,
the WOM referrals induce both a larger short-term response and a substantially
longer carryover effect.”).
156. See, e.g., Doohwang Lee, Hyuk Soo Kim & Jung Kyu Kim, The Impact of
Online Brand Community Type on Consumer’s Community Engagement Behaviors: Con-
sumer-Created vs. Marketer-Created Online Brand Community in Online Social-Networking
Web Sites, 14 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 59, 60 (2011).
157. See id. at 61.
158. See id.; see also id. at 62 (“[M]arketers may have to employ a passive role
when facilitating online brand communities such as being merely a sponsor of
consumer-created online brand communities.  It is certainly plausible that corpo-
rations can sponsor charity events or activities for members in consumer-created
communities.”).
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meshed duties and burdens placed on trademark owners that cause them
to fear the loss of their trademark rights if they fail to take action against
use of their mark by any third parties, including the trademark owner’s
own fans.  These risks include the potential for genericide and abandon-
ment for failure to police a mark or failure to maintain quality control if
the mark is licensed.  Moreover, consumer-initiated brand activities are in-
creasingly likely to be characterized as “confusing” (and thus infringing)
because of the way trademark confusion has been broadened to protect
brand owner interests in other contexts.
1. Genericide and the Duty to Police
While trademark law may be expanding in an attempt to protect the
investment interests of brand owners, it is still ill-suited to address the push
for greater consumer involvement in branding and in brand community
development.  Trademark owners have long been advised to monitor and
“police” third-party uses of trademarks identical to or similar to their own.
This obviously would include consumer-initiated activities involving the
owner’s trademarks.  The advice to trademark owners to police such use is
intended to prevent genericide and abandonment and to stop infringe-
ment.159  Trademark owners feel that they must remain vigilant in this
regard in order to avoid a determination by a court or by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that they have abandoned their
trademark.
A trademark will be deemed “abandoned” under Section 1127 of the
Lanham Act when “its use has been discontinued with intent not to re-
sume such use” or when “any course of conduct of the owner, including
acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the
generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is
used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark.”160  When broken
down into its bare elements, Section 1127 indicates that abandonment can
occur in three ways:
(1) a trademark owner intends to abandon the mark and thus
discontinues its use, (2) a trademark owner, through overt acts or
omissions, allows the mark to become the generic name for the
good or service with which it has been used, or (3) a trademark
owner, through overt acts or omissions, allows the mark to lose its
significance as a mark (such that it no longer identifies the
source of the good or service to a consumer).161
159. See William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the
Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 490 (2012)
(“The interviewed lawyers often cited a need to ‘police’ their clients’ trademarks
and copyrights.  They explained that the failure to do so on any particular occa-
sion could lead to difficulties in enforcing rights against other targets in the
future.”).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
161. See Kiser, supra note 17, at 225.
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The resulting “duty to police” third-party trademark usage that was
spawned from these grounds for abandonment is now considered a bed-
rock principle of trademark law.162  Some scholars have argued that the
uncertain boundaries of trademark law’s duty to police have led to aggres-
sive and exaggerated responses by some trademark owners to minor, per-
ceived threats by third parties—activity that has been called “trademark
bullying” in trademark scholarship and the popular media.163
When brand owners attempt to stop consumer-initiated brand activi-
ties, they are often called trademark bullies.164  IKEA was barraged with
intense criticism from both consumers and the press when it sent its cease-
and-desist letter to the owner of the IKEAhackers website.165  However,
brand owners often describe their actions as a necessary response dictated
by trademark law’s duty to police.166  Setting aside brand owners in-
tending to abandon a mark under Section 1127, brand owners are con-
cerned with consumer activities that may lead to genericide or may cause
the mark to lose its source-identifying significance.167 Genericide is a term
used to describe the process through which a distinct trademark loses its
ability to signify the source of the good or service product with which it has
been previously connected because the mark is now known by consumers
as a generic term.168  When genericide occurs, the trademark comes to be
162. See generally 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 31:38.
163. See Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM IN-
TELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 869, 866–71 (2012) (“A significant amount of
trademark bullying stems from bullies’ impression that to maintain a mark, it is the
owner’s duty to aggressively police it.  Thus, many bullying situations involve mark
owners who have taken this perceived duty to extreme levels.”); see also Grinvald,
supra note 17, at 628–30; Kiser, supra note 17, at 225; Jeremy N. Sheff, Fear and
Loathing in Trademark Enforcement, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
873, 873 (2012); Sara Marie Andrzejewski, Note, “Leave Little Guys Alone!”: Protecting
Small Businesses from Overly Litigious Corporations and Trademark Infringement Suits, 19
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 117, 118 (2011); Angus Loten, New Tool in Trademark Fights,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203
358704577237473534179392.html [https://perma.cc/5S5X-47KN] (discussing
small business strategy in making these matters public and the desired effects of
shaming).
164. See Manta, supra note 163, at 854 (“[A] trademark bully is usually a large
company that seeks to put an end to behavior by individuals and small businesses
that it perceives as a danger to its own intellectual property even though its legal
claims against these other parties are spurious or non-existent.”); see also, e.g.,
Loten, supra note 163 (discussing instance of trademark bullying).
165. See Campbell-Dollaghan, supra note 13; Doctorow, supra note 13;
Karmon, supra note 13.
166. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 159, at 490.
167. See Kiser, supra note 17, at 239 (“[T]rademark law imposes limitations on
what bullies feel are acceptable settlement terms, as they [ ] must also protect
against genericide.”); Manta, supra note 163, at 858 (“Trademark bullying is a
touchy problem because the law does require owners to police their marks if they
want to maintain exclusive rights in their marks and prevent so-called
‘genericide.’”).
168. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1790.
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known as the generic term used to describe the whole category of goods in
which that particular product exists.169
The history of the Aspirin trademark is one of the most commonly
cited examples of genericide.  Aspirin was once used by Bayer Company as
a fanciful trademark in connection with its acetyl salicylic acid pain re-
liever.170  When a defendant in an infringement suit argued that the mark
had become the generic term used by consumers to refer to all such pain
relievers produced by any manufacturer, the court in Bayer Co. v. United
Drug Co.171 held that the trademark Aspirin had lost its source-identifying
significance.172  That holding meant that aspirin had become a generic
term available in the public domain to any of Bayer’s competitors produc-
ing acetyl salicylic acid.173
In addition to the risk posed by genericide, a mark can also be
deemed abandoned under the Lanham Act if it loses its significance as a
mark.174  A mark that has lost such significance can no longer identify the
source of a particular good or service to consumers.  It is not the generic
label for the product class, as is the case for marks that have become ge-
neric, but it fails to serve the foundational purpose of a trademark, which
is to provide the shorthand link between the product and its source.175
The direct link between product or service and its source has been sev-
ered.  Trademark significance, as it pertains to abandonment, has been
explained by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
Without question, distinctiveness can be lost by failing to
take action against infringers.  If there are numerous products in
the marketplace bearing the alleged mark, purchasers may learn
to ignore the “mark” as a source identification.  When that oc-
curs, the conduct of the former owner, by failing to police its
mark, can be said to have caused the mark to lose its significance
as a mark.176
169. See id. at 1789–90.
170. See generally Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
171. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
175. See Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372,
1389–90 (D. Del. 1977).  The “loss of significance” grounds for abandonment is
often confused with the defense of acquiescence (a defense that can be raised
when a plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s infringing use of a mark and failed to
take action for an unreasonable period of time). See id.  Treatise author Thomas
McCarthy once explained the distinction as follows: “Acquiescence should not be
confused with abandonment of trademark rights.  The defense of abandonment
results in a loss of rights as against the world, while the defense of acquiescence
merely results in a loss of rights as against one defendant.” Id. at 1389 (quoting
6 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 31:14).
176. Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 766
(C.C.P.A. 1982).
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This duty to police serves as a justification for bully-like behavior by
trademark owners.177  However, the risk of losing one’s trademark as a
result of insufficient policing of the mark is quite low.  Courts have fre-
quently held that failure to police third-party use of a trademark is not
sufficient to cancel protection of the mark absent genericide or substantial
loss of trademark significance.178  The dispositive factor in cases where
courts have terminated trademarks is not a lack of policing, but whether
the trademark owner demonstrated intent to abandon the mark or al-
lowed the mark to be used so freely that it no longer was a distinct source
indicator.179  Courts must find facts sufficient to meet a “high burden of
proof” when deciding whether abandonment has occurred, and that bur-
den is rarely met.180
However, trademark owners and their counsel are likely aware of the
few instances in which genericide and loss of significance abandonment
have occurred.181  Those instances, while incredibly rare and based on
unique factual circumstances, remain salient.  Given the risk-averse nature
of attorneys and the cognitive biases that may amplify perceptions of such
risk, many brand owners are hesitant to allow consumer-initiated brand
activities, even though marketing research advocates their
encouragement.182
This disconnect between perceived duties under trademark law and
the marketing interests of brand owners is evidence of the uneasy manner
in which trademark law has attempted to accommodate the growth of
brands in the modern economy.  When consumers associate themselves
177. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 159, at 490.
178. See, e.g., Wallpaper Mfrs., 680 F.2d at 766.
179. See, e.g., Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900) (con-
firming Second Circuit’s holding that plaintiff could no longer enforce her rights
in mark HUNYADI for bottled water because mark had become generic in eyes of
consumers); Acme Valve & Fittings Co. v. Wayne, 386 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (S.D.
Tex. 1974) (finding intent to abandon due to discontinuance of manufacture, sell-
ing off of all inventory, and failure to renew trademark registration).
180. See STX, Inc. v. Bauer USA, Inc., No. C 96–1140 FMS, 1997 WL 337578,
at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1997) (“A party seeking to prove abandonment has a high
burden of proof.”); see also Citibank, N.A v. City Bank of S.F., No. C 79 1922, 1980
WL 30239, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1980) (“Abandonment places a strict burden
of proof upon the party seeking to prove abandonment.  The party seeking to
prove abandonment must prove an intent to abandon on the part of the trade-
mark owner.”).
181. See Kiser, supra note 17, at 230 (“Between the date of registration of the
mark in 1905 and the start of the cancelation proceeding on June 25, 1924, the
defendant trademark owner in this case had allowed numerous competitors to sell
high quantities of the same basic product under the ‘Milk of Magnesia’ mark.  The
Second Circuit determined that the defendant ‘had taken no steps whatever to
assert its rights, and had really ignored the extensive use by others.’  Such blatant
disregard for the trademark allowed it to become abandoned, because the mark
‘no longer indicat[[ed] [sic] the origin of the goods sold under it.’” (footnotes
omitted) (citing McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles H. Phillips Chem. Co., 53
F.2d 342, 344–45 (2d Cir. 1931))).
182. See id. at 225.
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with a brand community or engage in brand-related activities (like hosting
brand fan websites), they are not detracting from the original source iden-
tifying nature of the mark; rather, the mark is still being used by the brand
owner to identify itself as the source of the good or service.  Often, con-
sumer-initiated activity supports the brand owner’s desired source identifi-
cation because brand fans are quick to highlight the benefits of that
specific source and to direct other consumers to the brand owner’s official
resources.183  In this way, consumer-initiated brand activity builds the
strength of the brand and the source-related associations made in the
mind of new consumers or new fans of the brand.
Additionally, the risk of genericide for brand owners that allow brand
communities and other consumer-initiated activity is likely the same as the
risk faced by more conservative businesses.  Genericide has long been seen
as a risk faced by companies that become popular or famous.184  If you are
an early entrant into a product category (like Xerox) or control the major-
ity of the market share in that category (like Google), consumers may con-
flate your trademark with that product class.  These scenarios posed a risk
long before the advent of modern branding, and that risk remains rela-
tively unchanged.  However, brand owners may be able to use brand com-
munities and loyal brand fans to combat this risk.  Currently, trademark
owners use marketing and informational campaigns to combat this prob-
lem.185  In such campaigns, trademark owners routinely ask customers for
help in preventing genericide.  They explain the proper and improper
ways to use the company’s marks.  This seems like a ripe opportunity for
enlisting the help of one’s brand community filled with loyal consumers
willing to help lessen the risk of genericide.  While logic and marketing
literature would suggest that consumer involvement in branding may
strengthen a company’s trademarks, trademark law’s abandonment rules
and duty to police are not aligned with this aspect of branding.
2. Criticism of Trademark Expansion
While trademark law can be described as having expanded to protect
the investments trademark owners are making into their brands, there are
numerous reasons to question whether this expansion was in the best in-
terest of branding or of trademark law in general.  Numerous scholars
have argued that the expansion of trademark law to allow remedies for
dilution, initial-interest confusion, sponsorship confusion, and post-sale
183. For a discussion of Saab and Macintosh owners who perform this func-
tion, see supra notes 125–44 and accompanying text.
184. See Kiser, supra note 17, at 225–26 (discussing how cognitive biases may
lead to overly aggressive litigation tactics of trademark owners).
185. See Megan Garber, ‘Kleenex Is a Registered Trademark’ (and Other Desperate
Appeals), ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/arch
ive/2014/09/kleenex-is-a-registered-trademark-and-other-appeals-to-journalists/38
0733/ [https://perma.cc/B66Z-DLCE] (containing examples of these sorts of
print advertisements).
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confusion has broadened the idea of confusion to absurd levels.186  As
federal trademark law gets its congressional authority through the Com-
merce Clause, trademarks should be protected as a means of preventing
trade diversion and consumer deception (which was the historical goal in
preventing “passing off”).187  However, as trademark law has grown to pro-
tect the property-like investment interests of brand owners, it has veered
away from this focus.  Trademark law’s likelihood of confusion standard
now allows trademark owners to sue for any confusion, even when it is
irrelevant to the purchasing consumer, because any confusion could po-
tentially increase search costs for that consumer.188  Some scholars have
argued that this paternalistic approach to trademark law, which protects
consumers from all manners of possible confusion, is not supported by
current cognitive science research on consumer decision-making.189  Con-
sumers simply do not need to be coddled in this fashion.190
186. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 103, at 1708 (“But when trademark law
reaches beyond that—when it precludes a haberdasher from selling a hat with the
‘Cowboys’ logo, even when the circumstances preclude a finding of consumer con-
fusion—it has left its theoretical foundations.”); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McK-
enna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010) [hereinafter Lemley &
McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion] (“[T]rademark law has taken the concept of confu-
sion too far.”); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV.
49, 51 (2008) [hereinafter McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use] (“Many ob-
servers warn that this increased scope of trademark protection threatens free
speech, including both dissemination of useful commercial information and dis-
cussion, critique, or parody about famous brands and the culture they embody.”);
McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 46, at 70 (“Thus, over the
course of the last century, we have moved from a system in which confusion was
actionable only insofar as it related to the particular end of trade diversion to one
in which confusion itself defines the cause of action.  Trademark law, in other
words, now abstracts away from consumer decisions and targets confusion ‘in the
air.’”).
187. See Lemley, supra note 103, at 1708 (“The point of trademark law has
never been to maximize profits for trademark owners at the expense of competi-
tors and consumers.”).
188. See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 186, at 414
(“[C]ourts expanded the range of actionable confusion beyond confusion over the
actual source of a product—trademark law’s traditional concern—to include
claims against uses that might confuse consumers about whether the trademark
owner sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant’s goods.”); see also McKenna,
Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 46, at 72 (arguing that trademark liabil-
ity should only be permitted based on consumer confusion that would affect
purchasing decision).
189. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 39, at 829–31 (arguing that “ordinary prudent
consumer” in trademark cases needs to be reimagined to better reflect actual pru-
dent consumer); Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 2020 (2005) (analyzing inconsistent ways in which consumer is being used
and defined as either sovereign or fool in trademark cases); Rebecca Tushnet,
Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507
(2008) (arguing against cognitive model of dilution law).
190. See Beebe, supra note 189, at 2024 (“Trademark apologists, primarily
scholar-practitioners or academics of the law and economics tradition, have coun-
tered that the consumer is not nearly so gullible.”).
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Another effect of this expansion of trademark confusion is that brand
owners are often able to sue for trademark infringement when they have
suffered little to no harm from the defendant’s actions.191  Mark McKenna
and Mark Lemley have argued that there is little empirical support for the
argument that trademark owners require expanded confusion liability in
order to prevent “free riding” by third parties.192  Instead, the data indi-
cate that the alleged free rider may benefit from a non-competitive associ-
ation with another party’s trademark, but often that trademark owner
does not suffer any harm from this association.193  As such, trademark
owners are being given the ability to block others from a commercial ben-
efit without actually proving any harm underlying their infringement
claim.  Trademark owners are, in essence, being granted trademark mo-
nopolies with all of the “unjustified and inappropriate market power” that
entails.194
Branding is now a snake eating its own tail.  By expanding trademark
law to protect the investments made by businesses into their brands, trade-
mark law has made it easier to determine that a third party’s activity is
infringing.  This development means that consumer-initiated brand activi-
ties will more likely fall under the umbrella of confusion and be prohib-
ited or deterred, even though consumer activities rarely rise to the level of
“passing off.”  That outcome goes against marketing research that indi-
cates consumer-initiated branding is especially effective at developing
brand loyalty, increasing word-of-mouth advertising, and thus increasing
sales.
3. Quality Control and the Licensing Dilemma
If unauthorized use of a brand owner’s marks can cause abandon-
ment issues, one may wonder why the consumer-involved uses are not sim-
ply authorized in the first place.  Can licensing save a brand owner from
the duty to police and abandonment problems?  This approach is an op-
tion available to brand owners.  When IKEA changed direction and al-
lowed the continued operation of the IKEAhackers website, it is likely that
IKEA entered into some form of contractual licensing arrangement such
that the website owner would be required to operate within certain param-
eters regarding IKEA’s intellectual property.  In this way, IKEA can show
191. See Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 45, at 141 (propos-
ing “‘trademark injury’ requirement [in trademark law] is akin to the ‘antitrust
injury’ requirement currently used to weed out undeserving anti-trust plaintiffs”).
See generally Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95
IOWA L. REV. 63 (2009) (arguing that there should be no presumption of harm
from uses of marks for non-competing goods but presumption of harm in context
of market expansion may be justified).
192. See Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 45, at 156–65.
193. See id.
194. See Lunney, supra note 98, at 373 (discussing property justification for
trademark protection as pertains to evolution of trademark law and rise of anti-
competitive trademark monopolies).
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evidence that it is exercising some control over this now-authorized third-
party use of its marks.  However, this option is hard to manage on a large
scale.  Due to the quality control requirements imposed under trademark
law, it would be inefficient and potentially unmanageable for a brand
owner to allow large numbers of consumers to make licensed uses of the
brand owner’s marks.
Licensing consists of an arrangement, typically contractual, under
which a third party is authorized to use the trademark owner’s marks
under specific conditions.  This arrangement may occur when the trade-
mark owner wants to outsource production of the trademarked good to a
cheaper, third-party manufacturer, rather than manufacture the product
themselves.  It can also occur when a trademark owner wants to allow a
third party to create a new (and likely related) line of goods under the
established trademark, such as when the brand owner of OREO cookies
decides to authorize a third party to utilize the OREO mark in connection
with its line of ice cream flavors.  Corresponding with the growth of mod-
ern branding, some companies also enter into license agreements to pro-
duce merchandise like clothing and keychains that bear the licensed
trademark.  In these instances of promotional trademark licensing, the
consumer is seeking products that announce the consumer’s affinity for
and association with the brand.  Trademark law in the United States has
evolved from a time when licensing of a trademark was not permitted at
all.  It was prohibited under common law and the Trademark Act of 1905
because licensing was thought to be misleading in that it hid the true ori-
gin of a good or service.195  As such, it went against the trademark’s pri-
mary role of indicating the source of a good or service for a consumer.  As
licensing increasingly became a business necessity, the Lanham Act (the
Trademark Act of 1946) finally allowed the licensing of trademarks, but
contained several limitations on the practice.
For instance, Section 5 of the Lanham Act states that a registered
mark may be used “legitimately by related companies” where the use shall
“inure to the benefit of the registrant” and such use “shall not affect the
validity of such mark . . . provided such mark is not used . . . to deceive the
public.”196  This provision indicates that licensing is permitted if the par-
ties are “related companies” and consumers are not misled.  The Lanham
Act further defines a “related company” in Section 45 as “any person
whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with respect to
the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with
which the mark is used.”197  Based on the language of these provisions,
courts have indicated that a trademark owner must exercise control over a
195. See FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RE-
LATING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925); Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of
Trademarks (pt. 1), 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2012).
197. Id. § 1127.
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licensee in order to monitor the quality of the product being produced
under the licensed mark so that consumers will not be deceived.198
However, the statute does not specify the amount of control necessary
or the manner in which that control must be exercised.  If trademark own-
ers fail to exercise this quality control over licensees, then they have en-
tered into an invalid “naked license” that can lead to consumer
confusion.199  Naked licensing and insufficient quality control could po-
tentially lead to abandonment and forfeiture of the mark if it is deter-
mined that the mark has lost its significance and ability to serve its source-
identifying function.200  Irene Calboli has made a persuasive argument
that this quality control requirement has been greatly minimized by courts
that will rarely order a mark to be forfeited.201  Courts have found mini-
mal control to be sufficient or have upheld licenses upon proof that prod-
uct quality remained consistent.202  Calboli advocates for a revision of the
Lanham Act that would allow licensing “with or without ‘quality control’”
in light of the modern realities of the business of trademark licensing.203
However, Calboli acknowledges that despite this growing acceptance of
minimal or de facto licensing by the courts, “the traditional view that lack
of control will result in naked licensing has nonetheless continued to be
included in the language of most judicial decisions, proving courts are
generally reluctant to abandon quality control as the theoretical standard
for valid licensing.”204  As such, the actual licensing requirements under
the Lanham Act are uncertain and ambiguous.
Because failure to meet this uncertain quality control requirement
could potentially lead to forfeiture of a mark (and has done so on several
occasions205), trademark owners are routinely advised to include extensive
198. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 18:42; see also Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).
199. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 18:42; see also Dawn Donut Co., 267 F.2d
at 367.
200. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 18:42; see also Dawn Donut Co., 267 F.2d
at 366–67.
201. See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark Li-
censing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 366–74 (2007).
202. See, e.g., Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co.,
330 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1964) (finding sufficient quality control based on par-
ties’ long relationship and lack of consumer complaints about quality); Embedded
Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (upholding
license based on history of trouble-free manufacture by licensee); Hurricane Fence
Co. v. A-1 Hurricane Fence Co., 468 F. Supp. 975, 987–89 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (finding
sufficient control based on the fact that licensor and licensee were brothers); Jo-
seph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 715, 740
(E.D. Pa. 1962) (holding licensor exercised sufficient quality control such that
consumers were unlikely to be deceived).
203. See Calboli, supra note 201, at 396.
204. See id. at 376.
205. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 290 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
band promoter abandoned trademark by granting naked license); Barcamerica
Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
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quality control provisions in all license agreements.206  A licensor may be
advised to add quality control language in the license agreement that
would include specific guidelines for use of the mark, detailed specifica-
tions for the production of the product, product inspection and approval
requirements and procedures, a right on behalf of the licensor to inspect
the manufacturing facilities, and penalties for violating these terms.  For
example, a licensee could be obligated to submit to random inspections by
the licensor and to send product samples to the licensor every few months
or each time a new “batch” of the product is produced.
This is a burden on both parties.  Monitoring the quality of products
produced by licensees can be an onerous and time-consuming prospect
when imposed on traditional business-to-business transactions.  However,
the same uncertain quality control requirements would apply to any li-
cense that a brand owner enters into with its consumers.  IKEA is not terri-
bly burdened by having to monitor the use of its trademarks on the
IKEAHackers website, but this is not a feasible solution to allow wide-
spread consumer involvement in branding.  If IKEA were to enter into
individual licenses with each brand fan seeking to engage in brand-related
activities, it would incur substantial initial transaction costs and then the
more burdensome costs of monitoring all of those licensees.  Entering
into a blanket “fan license” would make monitoring trademark use more
difficult given the fact that the brand owner would not know the name,
location, and type of uses made under all of these de facto authorizations.
Such a blanket license would open the door to numerous future defend-
ants raising naked licensing as a defense in any infringement actions
brought by the brand owner.
Even if the company were to win on a finding of sufficient quality
control, the transaction costs incurred make this option untenable.  It is
simply easier for a brand owner to comply with current trademark law by
sending numerous cease-and-desist letters to discourage consumers from
trademark for wine abandoned due to lack of contractual or actual quality control
by licensor); Halo Mgmt., LLC v. Interland, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1028–30
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding license was naked due to lack of contractual right to
monitor or enforce quality); Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., 839 F. Supp. 1499,
1504–05 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding naked license due to lack of actual quality
control).
206. See, e.g., KENNETH L. PORT, JAY DRATLER, JR., FAYE M. HAMMERSLEY, TER-
ENCE P. MCELWEE, CHARLES R. MCMANIS & BARBARA A. WRIGLEY, LICENSING INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 303 (2d ed. 2005). See generally R.
CHARLES HENN JR., ALICIA GRAHN JONES, LAUREN SULLINS RALLS & LAUREN A. LIN-
DER, INTELL. PROP. DESK REFERENCE, TRADEMARK LICENSING BASICS 69 (2015), avail-
able at https://clients.kilpatricktownsend.com/IPDeskReference/Documents/
Trademark%20Licensing%20Basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS4L-RVR6]; Timothy
J. Kelly, Trademark Licensing Consideration Checklist, 69 TRADEMARK 475 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.pli.edu/emktg/toolbox/TM_Licensing14.pdf [https://perma
.cc/PQA4-38ER]; Monique L. Ribando & Michael S. Pavento, Quality Control in
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engaging with the owner’s marks.  Additionally, licensing a consumer’s
brand-related activity may make it “official” or “authorized” in the minds
of other consumers.  As discussed above, this could result in more con-
sumer cynicism about such activity and less of the brand loyalty benefits
realized by purely consumer-initiated efforts.
4. Brands and Trademark Fair Use
Finally, it must be stated that the First Amendment is not irrelevant to
the world of trademarks.  However, it is rarely helpful to those consumers
looking to create brand communities or make non-parody uses of trade-
marks.207  Robert Denicola once reasoned that limits on commercial
speech were exempt from constitutional scrutiny because “[t]he informa-
tion conveyed through the use of a trademark generally relates not to the
momentous philosophical or political issues of the day, but rather to the
details of prospective commercial transactions—the source or quality of
specific goods or services.”208  However, it is clear that this statement is
overly simplistic in light of the modern world of brands: “Corporations no
longer exist in a purely commercial world.”209  Given the highly creative
nature of brand development, it follows that the rights of brand owners
may conflict at times with the expressive interests of consumers wanting to
align themselves with or comment somehow upon that creative content.
The consumer’s increasing role in brand development is just one part of
this puzzle.  If a brand owner is unwilling to allow consumer expression
related to the brand, then one must look to the First Amendment safe-
207. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 473 (2013) (arguing trademark fair use may excuse brand parodies
from liability in some cases); William McGeveran, The Imaginary Trademark Parody
Crisis (and the Real One), 90 WASH. L. REV. 713 (2015) (arguing that reforms aimed
at unsubstantiated and threatening pre-litigation tactics would ensure protection
for trademark parodies better than trademark doctrine reform).  More free speech
protection is generally granted to parodies under both trademark and copyright
law. See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra.  Parodies utilize some amount of a copy-
righted work or trademark in order to comment on or criticize the protected work
or mark. Id.  For this reason, parodies are generally described as being closer to
the heart of the First Amendment and the underlying purpose of the fair use de-
fense. Id.
208. See Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market, supra note 95, at 480 (quoting
Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of Emerging Ra-
tionales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 158–59) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Heymann, supra note 61, at 696 (“[T]rademarks
have recently taken on yet another communicative function: as an element of cul-
tural discourse.  Trademarks are now used as a linguistic shorthand in addition to
an economic one, as a way of describing something more efficiently or creating a
shared discourse through a common cultural referent.  When we hear about some-
thing being as difficult as ‘nailing Jell-O to the wall’ or refer to something as the
‘Cadillac of its class,’ those of us who are familiar with the product and its advertis-
ing persona understand what the speaker is saying.” (footnote omitted)).
209. See Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market, supra note 95, at 456 (arguing
that corporations should be treated as public figures when analyzing corporate
speech under First Amendment).
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guards built into trademark law to see if they provide adequate avenues for
the balancing of these competing interests.
Fair use, under both trademark and copyright law, is often described
as a means of integrating those doctrines with the broad expression and
speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.  However, the trade-
mark fair use doctrine has been described as another example of “trade-
mark law’s inability to handle the consumer dimension of brands.”210
While it is generally conceded in the abstract that purely expressive, non-
competitive uses of trademarks should be permitted as fair uses of the
marks, case law indicates that this is often not true in practice.211  The
Ninth Circuit went so far as to state, “Trademarks are part of our common
language, and we all have some right to use them to communicate in
truthful, non-misleading ways.”212  However, courts struggle to determine
what constitutes an “expressive use of a mark and what constitutes fair use”
in this “unclear and unstable area of trademark law.”213  Additionally, the
expansion of trademark rights in favor of brand owners may have en-
couraged aggressive tactics by brand owners faced with third-party uses; as
a result, much expressive use of brands is stopped before a suit is ever
filed.214
On its face, the fair use defense to trademark infringement falls into
one of two categories: descriptive fair use or nominative fair use.  Descrip-
tive fair use applies when the defendant uses the plaintiff’s trademark in a
descriptive fashion in good faith in order to describe its own goods or
services.215  In Zatarains v. Oak Grove Smokehouse,216 the court held that
competitors were permitted to use the term “fish fry” to describe a type of
seasoned breading for use when making fried fish recipes under the doc-
trine of descriptive fair use, despite the fact that Zatarains possessed a
trademark for the phrase “Fish Fri” for use with its own products.217
210. See Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, supra note 19, at 1031.
211. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774–78
(8th Cir. 1994); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43–45 (2d Cir. 1994);
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204–05
(2d Cir. 1979); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d
727, 727–35 (D. Minn. 1998).
212. See Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1185 (9th
Cir. 2010).
213. See Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, supra note 19, at 1031.
214. See generally McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, supra note 186 (ar-
guing that even when courts reach right decision on fair use, trademark law’s un-
certainty in area could still chill expressive speech).
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012). See generally KP Permanent Make-Up,
Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated by KP Permanent Make-Up,
543 U.S. 111 (2004).
216. 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated by KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S.
111 (2004).
217. See id. at 796.
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Nominative fair use allows a party to use a trademark owned by an-
other when that use is needed to refer to the trademark owner or its prod-
ucts.218  In New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.,219 for
instance, the Ninth Circuit determined that a newspaper’s use of the
trademarked name of the plaintiff band was a non-infringing nominative
fair use, as the newspaper was using the trademark in a truthful manner to
conduct a survey that required making a reference to the trademark.220
In Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari,221 Chief Judge Kozinski ex-
plained that when the nominative fair use defense is raised in the Ninth
Circuit, a court must ask whether “(1) the product was ‘readily identifiable
without use of the mark; (2) defendant used more of the mark than neces-
sary; or (3) defendant falsely suggested he was sponsored or endorsed by
the trademark holder.”222  This test is intended to balance the rights of
the defendant to be able to make expressive or descriptive uses of a trade-
marked word or phrase with the interests of the trademark owner in
preventing consumer confusion.223  If the defendant used the mark when
it was unnecessary in violation of prong one, used the mark more than
necessary in violation of prong two, or confused consumers into thinking
there was a sponsorship relationship in place between the defendant and
the trademark owner in violation of prong three, then the defendant does
not receive the benefit of the fair use defense.
The Third Circuit applies a modified version of this test with the same
basic first and second prongs, but the third prong asks instead whether the
“defendant’s conduct or language reflect[s] the true and accurate rela-
tionship between plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.”224  At its
heart, the nominative fair use defense, in either formulation, is still con-
cerned first and foremost with trademark law’s purported goal of prevent-
ing consumer confusion.  Whenever a consumer creates a brand
community or uses a mark in a similar non-competitive fashion, there will
always be the possibility that some unaffiliated consumers will be confused
as to the brand community’s sponsorship or affiliation with the brand
owner.225  Therefore, given the broad allowance for confusion by most
218. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 23:11.
219. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
220. See id. at 310.
221. 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).
222. See Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 610 F.3d at 1175–76.
223. See id. at 1176–77 (“This test ‘evaluates the likelihood of confusion in
nominative use cases.’  It’s designed to address the risk that nominative use of the
mark will inspire a mistaken belief on the part of consumers that the speaker is
sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder.” (citation omitted)).
224. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222
(3d Cir. 2005).
225. Parodies regarding brands may be the exception. See Dogan & Lemley,
supra note 207, at 508 (“If, as we believe, trademark parodies are a unique and
non-replicable form of speech about trademark holders, then they resemble the
sorts of uses that nominative fair use seeks to protect.  They involve speech about
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modern courts, courts will rarely permit consumers to utilize trademarks
for the community-building and identity-reinforcing activities inherent in
brand communities once an action by a trademark owner has been initi-
ated.  The current boundaries on trademark fair use simply ignore “what
brand management literature acknowledges and exploits: people use
brands in ways that are beyond source identification and beyond legal con-
ceptions of speech.”226
III. BRANDS AS COPYRIGHTS
Because brands serve creative and expressive purposes beyond the
source identification function of trademarks, brands are better conceptu-
alized under the framework of copyrights.  Copyright protection is
founded on the idea of balancing the interests of the creator of works with
the expressive and informational interests of the public.  As such, it pro-
vides a strong foundation for understanding the full potential of brands as
creative works that invite the expressive involvement of consumers.
A. Brands as Copyrightable Works
Brands, as creative undertakings, fit neatly under copyright law.  Cop-
yright protection automatically attaches to “original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”227  In Feist Publications v. Ru-
ral Telephone Service,228 Justice O’Connor stated that “[t]he sine qua non of
copyright is originality.”229  However, it is not difficult to meet this origi-
nality requirement; the work must be independently created by the author
and possess a minimal amount of creativity.230  Again in Feist, the Court
the trademark holder, and they cannot serve their inherent function—indeed,
they can’t be a parody—without borrowing from the original.”).
226. See Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, supra note 19, at 1032.
Community dimensions of brands fare no better under trademark law
than consumer dimensions and are possibly in worse shape.  By their na-
ture, community brand situations involve a group of consumer enthusi-
asts who take it upon themselves to define the brand.  This group may
engage in one or more activities, including building Web sites, holding
meetings, writing polemics, creating artwork, and producing branded
merchandise.  The mark in question will be prominently displayed, dis-
cussed, and distributed.  In many cases the mark will appear as or near
how it was originally displayed precisely because of the power of that con-
text.  Trademark law, however, asks whether these acts are likely to cause
confusion, and the nature of the test for that question does not provide
room for this sort of community action.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
228. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
229. See id. at 345; see also L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law:
The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 719, 763 & n.155 (1989) (“The originality requirement is constitutionally man-
dated for all works.”).
230. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
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clarified, “To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even
a slight amount will suffice.  The vast majority of works make the grade
quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude,
humble or obvious’ it might be.”231
This originality requirement is so minimal that the Supreme Court
has said that “[c]reation of a nonfiction work, even a compilation of pure
fact, entails originality.”232  However, that compilation of pure fact would
require originality in the selection, coordination, or arrangement of the
non-protectable factual information.233  Therefore, courts have held that
the creators of photographs may claim copyright in their work,234 as can
the creator of a taxonomy listing dental insurance billing codes,235 and
the author of real estate maps of a Texas county.236  While it is obvious
that the originality standard presents only a small hurdle for those seeking
copyright protection, such protection has been denied if this minimal re-
quirement is not met.  The phone book at issue in Feist was denied copy-
right protection based on a lack of originality due to the typical,
alphabetical manner in which it presented factual information.237  Simi-
larly, in Southco, Inc. v Kanebridge Corp.,238 copyright was denied for a list-
ing of codes used in a replacement parts catalog that used a conventional
organizational system.239
While it has been said, as mentioned above, that trademarks do not
“depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain” and
require “no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought,”240
this statement is simply not true regarding brands (and may have never
been entirely true of trademarks).  Advertisers and brand owners view
brand efforts as storytelling.  Through advertisements in print, online, on
television, and other media, the company tells the story of the brand as
they want it to be seen by consumers.  These brand stories have all of the
elements needed to justify copyright protection.
First, brand stories are based on independent marketing campaigns
that are created by the marketing firms or in-house marketing depart-
231. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (quoting 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT
§ 1.08(C)(1) (1990)).
232. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547.
233. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
234. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (es-
tablishing precedent that photographs are original works capable of receiving cop-
yright protection).
235. See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 981 (7th
Cir. 1997).
236. See Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 1992)
(establishing precedent that real estate maps are capable of receiving copyright
protection).
237. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362–63.
238. 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
239. See id. at 285.
240. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
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ments, which are employed by the brand owner.241  Each print advertise-
ment, commercial, or website is therefore independently created and, as
creativity is a low bar, they each possess the minimal amount of creativity
required for copyright protection.  If copyright can be obtained for a pho-
tograph or a taxonomic listing of billing codes, then it follows that print
advertisements and television or radio commercials would also possess the
requisite creativity.  However, this was not always so settled.  In 1891, the
Supreme Court in Higgins v. Keuffel242 held that commercial writings like
product labels would not be eligible for copyright protection if they could
have “no possible influence upon science or the useful arts,” based on the
wording of the Constitution granting federal authority over the copyright
system.243  The Court asserted that copyright protection was available only
for works that had value “as a composition” apart from the product which
it advertised or described.244  For copyright protection to attach, the writ-
ing must serve a purpose other than that of a “mere advertisement.”245
However, the Court’s view of the copyrightability of advertising
changed course shortly thereafter.  In 1903, the Supreme Court upheld
copyright protection for an illustration used in an advertisement for a cir-
cus in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.246  The Court reiterated that
the pictorial works in question were original and creative enough to justify
copyright protection, as they contained more originality than “directories
and the like, which may be copyrighted.”247  The use of the article does
not change its nature as a creative work.  Therefore, “[a] picture is none
the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used for
an advertisement.”248
Subsequent cases recognized that this was a significant change in the
treatment of advertising: “The Bleistein Case established a new and liberal
standard with respect to the originality or artistic merit required to entitle
illustrated advertising matter—now frequently referred to as ‘commercial
241. It is not necessary to go into a detailed discussion of ownership of the
resulting work for the purposes of this Article.  Absent a contract assigning owner-
ship of the advertising work to the brand owner, it is likely that the outside market-
ing firm would be considered an independent contractor with ownership of the
resulting work.  However, under the works made for hire provision of the Copy-
right Act, advertising created by in-house marketing employees would automati-
cally be owned by the brand owner’s employer.  17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
242. 140 U.S. 428 (1891).
243. See id. at 431; see also Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertis-
ing, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 189, 216 (2006) (questioning utilitarian
justifications of copyright protection for advertising).
244. See Higgins, 140 U.S. at 431.
245. See id.
246. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).
247. See id. at 250.
248. See id. at 251; see also SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“That the photographs were intended solely
for commercial use has no bearing on their protect[a]bility.”).
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art’—to the protection of copyright statutes.”249  Based on this low origi-
nality requirement and new liberal approach to advertising materials, the
court in Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co.250 upheld the validity of a cop-
yright on an advertisement for cosmetic and toilet articles.251  This more
liberal standard was implemented again when the Ninth Circuit in Drop
Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.252 upheld copyright protection for the
label of a commercial cleaning product.  The eligibility of copyright pro-
tection of advertising is widely accepted now.253  In Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits,
Inc.,254 the Ninth Circuit went so far as to grant copyright protection to
photographs of a vodka bottle taken for advertising purposes while refus-
ing to extend such protection to the underlying bottles themselves, based
on its determination that the bottle was a purely utilitarian “useful article”
incapable of copyright protection.255
While courts are now willing to accept print and television advertise-
ments as original works of authorship deserving of copyright protection,
those advertisements must still be “fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression . . . .”256  Fixation is sufficient if the work “can be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.”257  The work must be capable of being “perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transi-
tory duration.”258
Again, this is not a difficult requirement to meet for most advertising.
Printed advertisements, whether they are contained in newspapers,
magazines, or even standalone pamphlets, are all clearly fixed on paper.
Television and radio commercials (that are not broadcast live) are fixed as
a “motion picture” or “sound recording” (as those terms are used in the
249. See Ansehl v. Puritan Pharm. Co., 61 F.2d 131, 134–35 (8th Cir. 1932)
(emphasis added).
250. 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932).
251. See id. at 136.
252. 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963).
253. See, e.g., Comptone Co. v Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1958)
(extending copyright protection to sunglass display cards and leaflets);
Griesedieck W. Brewery Co. v Peoples Brewing Co., 56 F. Supp. 600, 606 (D. Minn.
1944) (extending copyright protection to portion of beer can label); Advertisers
Exch., Inc. v Bayless Drug Store, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 169, 169 (D.N.J. 1943) (ex-
tending copyright protection to advertisements).
254. 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
255. See id. at 1080.  Under the Copyright Act, a useful article “is an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance
of the article or to convey information.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining useful
article).  A useful article is only eligible for copyright protection “if, and only to the
extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article.” Id. (defining pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works).
256. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
257. See id.
258. See id. § 101 (defining fixed).
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Copyright Act) in the same manner as other works falling under these
definitions.259  Even websites and online advertisements are fixed in elec-
tronic computer memory and are thus protectable.260
However, this requirement may exclude less structured forms of ad-
vertising from protection.  For example, live promotional events and cam-
paigns would not be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.  This has
long held true for live musical and dramatic performances, but such per-
formances may receive copyright protection in other ways.  If the live per-
formance is based on a written script, then the script is fixed and
protectable, which indirectly protects the performance.261  Brand owners
could also use this strategy.  Additionally, “[a] work consisting of sounds,
images, or both, that are being transmitted” will be considered fixed
under the Copyright Act if “fixation of the work is being made simultane-
ously with its transmission.”262  Thus, recording live promotional activities
would allow brand owners to receive copyright protection.  This will be of
special concern to brand owners engaged in nontraditional or viral
marketing.
While copyright protection is denied to advertising activities that fail
to meet the fixation requirement, it will also not prevent third parties from
using and repeating some of the information contained in protected ad-
vertisements.  Copyright protection will not be afforded to purely factual
information or to the ideas contained within a work.  In Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the Court stated with certainty that “[n]o
author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.”263  This is codi-
fied in Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which states:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of au-
thorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.264
259. See id. (defining motion pictures and sound recordings).  Motion pictures
and sound recordings are both listed as works of authorship expressly falling
under the subject matter of copyright. See id. § 102(6)–(7).
260. These would likely be classified under the Copyright Act as “audiovisual
works,” which are defined as “works that consist of a series of related images which
are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as
projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds,
if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in
which the works are embodied.” See id. § 101 (defining audiovisual works).
261. See id. § 106(5).  Public performance of written work (i.e., “literary, musi-
cal, dramatic, and choreographic works”) is one of the exclusive rights granted
under copyright. Id.
262. See id. § 101.
263. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539,
556 (1985).
264. 15 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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Therefore, factual information contained in an advertisement, such as
facts pertaining to product specifications, qualities, or prices, will not be
protected and may be freely repeated by consumers and competitors.
Additionally, copyright protection only extends to the expressive or
creative aspects of the advertisement and would not protect the ideas con-
tained therein.  In Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc.,265 the Seventh Cir-
cuit refused to extend copyright protection to the general idea or theme
of polishing an old car and the idea of making claims based on laboratory
testing, as such ideas were used in similar, competing car wax commer-
cials.266  In Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co.,267 the court refused to
extend copyright protection to items displaying the general ideas of
friendship, sunshine, and flowers where the defendant sold products con-
taining similar images and wording to convey the same themes.268 It fol-
lows that a brand owner cannot prevent a competitor from, for example,
using the general idea of a cartoon character as a brand mascot in adver-
tising for children’s cereal.269
Furthermore, copyright cannot be used to grant monopolies over
commonly used phrases, slogans, or short expressions lacking sufficient
originality, or over any specific word necessary to express a particular
point.  The Copyright Office has specifically clarified that certain types of
works are excluded from copyright eligibility, including “[w]ords and
short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans . . . .”270  In Perma Greetings,
the court also addressed this issue and denied copyright protection for the
short phrases, like “hang in there,” that the plaintiff had included on its
mug-type coasters.271  Based on these copyright limitations, brand owners
would not be able to rely on copyright protection for short phrases and
slogans used in branding materials.  However, such short phrases might be
eligible for trademark protection if they were used to signify the source of
the good or service being offered.
Additionally, the judicially created “merger doctrine” denies copy-
right protection to any work where the wording of the work represents the
only way, or one of but a few ways, of expressing the idea underlying the
work.272  In such cases, the idea and its expression are said to merge to-
265. 77 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 1996).
266. See id. at 913–14.
267. 598 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
268. See id. at 449.
269. This is clearly an example of an unoriginal idea, given all of the cartoon
mascots currently being used for children’s cereal, including, for example, Trix
Rabbit, Tony the Tiger, Boo Berry, Franken Berry, Lucky the Leprechaun, Count
Chocula, Sonny the Cuckoo Bird, Dig ‘Em Frog, Snap, Crackle, Pop, and Toucan
Sam.
270. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2015).
271. See Perma Greetings, 598 F.Supp. at 448–49 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
272. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir.
1967).
44
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss1/2
2016] BRANDS AS COPYRIGHT 89
gether; therefore, the First Amendment interests of those seeking to con-
vey that particular idea would be harmed by the protection of the merged
expression.273  Similar reasoning led to the denial of copyright protection
for the baked goods preparation and serving directions at issue in Kitchens
of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp.274  There are very few ways to express
the underlying idea that one should thaw a frozen cake and then slice it
into individual servings.275  Therefore, routine phrases and formulaic
wording, like that used by brand owners in promotional descriptions or
sweepstakes rules, would not be protected due to the merger doctrine.276
While each fixed advertising work is copyrightable, subject to the limi-
tations discussed above, each work is part of a larger brand campaign or
overall strategy.  They are all part of the larger brand story that is being
told in pieces, in various media, to consumers.  As these pieces are not
explicitly created as “serial works” (such that they lack the requisite se-
quential numbering that one would find in a daily edition of a newspaper
or a single issue of a comic book series), they cannot be registered as serial
works under the Copyright Act.277  However, courts can still consider all of
the pieces of the brand story as a whole in an infringement analysis.  Ap-
plying such a big picture approach to advertising would be novel, but this
approach has been taken with regard to television programs or books writ-
ten as a series.  For example, the Second Circuit decided to treat the
eighty-six copyrighted episodes of the Seinfeld television series as a single
work for the purposes of determining infringement in Castle Rock Entertain-
ment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.278  The court in Warner Brothers
Entertainment, Inc. v. RDR Books279 followed the reasoning established in
Castle Rock when it analyzed infringement of the seven Harry Potter books as
a whole rather than analyzing the infringement of each individual
novel.280
273. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
274. 266 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1959).
275. See id.
276. Compare Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678–79 (employing merger doctrine), with
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1958) (granting insurance
forms thin copyright protection against purely duplicative copying).
277. See Copyright Registration for Single Serial Issues, CIRCULAR 62.0811 (U.S.
Copyright Office, Wash., D.C.), Aug. 2011, at 1, available at http://www.copyright
.gov/circs/circ62.pdf [https://perma.cc/QVY8-43ZZ].  Serial works are “works is-
sued or intended to be issued in successive parts bearing numerical or chronologi-
cal designations and intended to be continued indefinitely.” Id.  This would
include works such as newspapers, journals, and bulletins.  In some instances, se-
rial works may be registered as a group (rather than individually) thereby saving
the author some registration costs.
278. 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998).
279. 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
280. See id. at 535 n.14 (analyzing “the amount of expression copied from the
Harry Potter series in the aggregate, rather than from each individual novel in the
series” and finding that defendant’s encyclopedia of Harry Potter terminology and
characters infringed copyrighted works).
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However, one could also view all of the branding messages produced
by a brand owner as interconnected pieces rather than a unitary whole.
Subsequent brand activities that follow an initial branding effort could be
viewed as derivative works of that first copyrightable work.  For an example
of how derivative branding could play out, one could look to Apple’s now
iconic “Get a Mac” campaign, in which numerous commercials contrasted
the personification of a PC-type computer, portrayed by comedian and
author John Hodgman, with Apple’s Mac computer, portrayed by actor
Justin Long.281  The first “Get a Mac” commercial aired in 2006 and was
intended to communicate a clear branding story to consumers: Mac com-
puters are fun, innovative, and user-friendly, and Mac users are young,
energetic, and hip, in contrast to the traditional, stuffy, older users of
Microsoft (i.e., PC) computers.282  This same message was continued
through the other sixty-six commercials in the campaign, which ran until
2009.283  Each of these subsequent commercials was likely registered
under an individual copyright, but each could also be seen as a derivative
work of that first commercial.  The Copyright Act defines a derivative work
as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.  A work consisting of edi-
torial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
“derivative work[.]”284
This distinction between an independently copyrighted work and a
copyrightable derivative work may not have much practical effect when
the works at issue all arise from the brand owner directly.  In both cases,
the brand owner owns any possible copyrights and controls use of the
works.  However, the distinction becomes much more important when the
derivative work is consumer-initiated.  Such is the case with websites like
the IKEAHackers site, which was created by an IKEA customer for the ben-
efit of the website owner and other IKEA brand fans.
281. See Tim Nudd, Apple’s ‘Get a Mac,’ the Complete Campaign: Hodgman and
Long, Ad Characters for the Ages, ADWEEK (Apr. 13, 2011, 6:49 PM), http://www.ad
week.com/adfreak/apples-get-mac-complete-campaign-130552 [https://perma
.cc/MCN7-J7X7]; see also Lindsay Kolowich, Mac or PC?  A Brief History of Apple &
Microsoft’s Ad War, HUBSPOT BLOGS (Jan. 9, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://blog.hubspot
.com/marketing/mac-pc-advertising-history [https://perma.cc/236P-H9C7].
282. See Nudd, supra note 281; see also Eric Jaffe, How Apple’s Famous “I’m a
Mac” Ads Branded Fanboys for Life, FAST CO. (Feb. 26, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.
fastcodesign.com/3026521/evidence/apples-famous-ads-created-an-im-a-mac-ef
fect [https://perma.cc/3MWL-AP46].
283. See Nudd, supra note 281.
284. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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While it is generally true that the Copyright Act “grants the author of
a derivative work copyright protection in the incremental original expres-
sion he contributes” to the original work,285 copyright protection will only
attach to that original expression if the derivative work was created with
the consent of the original copyright owner.286  This means that “[t]o be
copyrightable, a derivative work must not be infringing.”287  The owner of
the copyright to the original, underlying work possesses the exclusive
rights to (1) reproduce the work; (2) prepare derivative works based upon
the work; (3) distribute copies of the work to the public; (4) perform the
work publicly; (5) display the work publicly; and (6) perform the work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission in the case of sound re-
cordings.288  Violating any of these exclusive rights would constitute in-
fringement of the copyright; therefore, it constitutes infringement if a fan
creates a derivative work based on copyrighted brand material without the
brand owner’s consent.  For example, in Anderson v. Stallone,289 the plain-
tiff was denied copyright protection for his screenplay for Rocky IV.290  The
court held that the plaintiff lacked the consent of the owner of the copy-
right to the original three Rocky films and therefore could not receive cop-
yright protection for the original elements he added in his derivative
work.291
This is an important aspect of copyright law from the perspective of
brand owners.  Consumers will not possess a copyright on any of their de-
rivative works created using the copyrightable brand materials or, as ar-
gued herein, the copyrightable expression contained within the larger
brand story.  Thus, brand owners need not worry about genericide and
risks of abandonment in the same way that they worry when consumer
involvement in branding is viewed under the umbrella of trademark law.
Consumers are not creating competing copyrightable content based on
the owner’s trademark and brand.  If such consumer-initiated branding
285. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 2009).
286. See id. at 523 (“This means the author of a derivative work must have
permission to make the work from the owner of the copyright in the underlying
work.”); see also Gracen v. Branford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1983)
(“[E]ven if Miss Gracen’s painting and drawings had enough originality to be copy-
rightable as derivative works she could not copyright them unless she had authority
to use copyrighted materials from the movie.”).
287. See Schrock, 586 F.3d at 522; see also Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 406–07
(7th Cir. 2000) (stating plaintiff did not have permission to make derivative work
based on defendant’s copyrighted design and was therefore infringing).
288. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
289. No. 87–0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989).
290. See id. at *5–6.  Additionally, this case reiterates that individual characters
within a work may be afforded copyright protection.  This is relevant to brand
since well-defined characters in advertising campaigns could potentially be copy-
rightable. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
(noting copyright protection can be granted to a character if the character is de-
veloped with enough specificity so as to rise to level of protectable expression).
291. See Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *5–6.
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occurs without the express consent of the brand owner, then the brand
owner has the option under copyright law to bring suit for infringement of
the derivative work right.  In this way, consumer branding activities can be
viewed and treated in the same way that copyright owners currently treat
fanfiction.
Fanfiction has been characterized as non-professional writing by a fan
that uses as its source an identifiable cultural work such as a novel or a
movie.292  An author has the freedom to bring a copyright suit against the
creator of fanfiction based on the author’s work or to turn a blind eye to
such activities altogether without the risks of genericide and abandonment
built into trademark law.293  Neil Gaiman, author of numerous best-selling
books, explicitly allows fanfiction based on his books explaining, “I don’t
believe I’ll lose my rights to my characters and books if I allow/fail to
prevent/turn a blind eye to people writing say Neverwhere fiction, as long
as those people aren’t, say, trying to sell books with my characters in.”294
He sees the benefit to his fans: “[G]iven how much people enjoy it, it’s
obviously doing some good. It doesn’t bother me.”295  However, other
copyright owners take a different view of fanfiction, which constitutes an
unlicensed derivative work of their own creation.  Author Anne Rice ex-
plained, “I do not allow fan-fiction.  The characters are copyrighted.  It
upsets me terribly to even think about fan-fiction with my characters.  I
advise my readers to write your own original stories with your own charac-
ters.  It is absolutely essential that you respect my wishes.”296  Diana
Gabaldon, author of the Outlander series, thinks fanfiction is immoral and
has said that she “want[s] to barf whenever [she has] inadvertently en-
countered some of it involving [her] characters.”297
Copyright owners have the discretion to allow fanfiction.  As fanfic-
tion and branding both entail consumers engaging with a product in an
292. See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Com-
mon Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 655 (1997) (“‘Fan fiction,’ broadly speaking,
is any kind of written creativity that is based on an identifiable segment of popular
culture, such as a television show, and is not produced as ‘professional’ writing.”).
See generally Stacey M. Lantagne, The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for True
and Logical Precedent, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 159 (2011).
293. However, copyright owners who ignore fanfiction creations based on
their work could run the risk of having a future claim against the fanfiction author
dismissed under the equitable defense of laches.  This defense can be raised when
a plaintiff is said to have unreasonably delayed in asserting a claim, and a court
may hold that delay unfairly prejudices the defendant. See 30A C.J.S. EQUITY § 138
(2015).
294. See Neil Gaiman, Neil Gaiman’s Opinion on Fanfiction, TUMBLR (Apr. 24,
2012, 6:46 PM), http://neil-gaiman.tumblr.com/post/21746253134/neil-gaimans-
opinion-on-fanfiction [https://perma.cc/G2RY-SCPV].
295. See id.
296. See George R.R. Martin, Book Post: How Authors Feel About Fan-fiction,
ONTD (Apr. 19, 2012, 12:04 PM), http://ohnotheydidnt.livejournal.com/683326
29.html#ixzz3HrLzXDJr [https://perma.cc/55KM-8FB8] (internal quotation
marks omitted).
297. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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expressive fashion, and both could lead to increased sales for the underly-
ing copyright or brand owner, it seems logical that the discretion about
when to stop such activity should be reserved for the copyright or brand
owner.  Branding is an expressive activity entitled to copyright protection,
so it follows that brand owners should be able to exercise discretion re-
garding any infringement of their copyrightable brands.  If consumer-initi-
ated brand activities occur without the brand owner’s consent, then brand
owners have the choice under copyright law to turn a blind eye to the
activity, to bring suit for infringement of the derivative work right, or to
enter into a blanket or individual license with such consumers on terms
acceptable to the brand owner.
B. Applying Copyright Fair Use to Brands
Where brand owners deny consumers the ability to use branded
materials, consumer-initiated branding activities would be a violation of
copyright law.  Copyright infringement occurs whenever any one of the
exclusive rights of a copyright owner is violated.  However, some violations
are expressly excused in the interest of the First Amendment and the pub-
lic domain.  The constitutional mandate that a federal system of copyright
protection be created to promote the progress of science and the arts has
long instructed courts that “copyright is intended to increase and not to
impede the harvest of knowledge.”298
Therefore, there is a natural tension that exists between increasing
knowledge and hindering it.  This tension is played out in the balance that
is struck between the Copyright Act and the First Amendment.  The Su-
preme Court has acknowledged “that some restriction on expression is the
inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright . . . .”299  How-
ever, the refusal of copyright law to protect facts and ideas, as well as the
statutory fair use defense, are recognized as copyright law’s limitations that
balance the restriction on expression granted with a copyright monopoly
with the free speech requirements of the First Amendment.300  The Su-
preme Court routinely praises this balance: “All reproductions of the
work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of the copyright
owner; some are in the public domain.  Any individual may reproduce a
copyrighted [work] for a ‘fair use’[;] the copyright owner does not possess
the exclusive right to such a use.”301  The fair use defense was codified in
298. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545
(1985).
299. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 876 (2012).
300. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); see also Golan, 132 S. Ct.
at 890.
301. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433
(1984); see also Harper, 471 U.S. at 549 (“Fair use was traditionally defined as ‘a
privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material
in a reasonable manner without his consent.’”).
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the Copyright Act and states that courts analyzing the defense should con-
sider the following factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.302
In a fair use analysis, the court must first determine “the purpose and
character of the use” of the copyrighted work.303  The purpose of the use
refers to whether the new work was created for commercial or for non-
profit reasons.304  “If a new work is used commercially rather than for a
nonprofit purpose, its use will less likely qualify as fair.”305  Additionally,
courts must determine the character of the use by asking whether the na-
ture of the work has changed, meaning whether the alleged infringer has
created something fundamentally different from the original work.306
The fair use doctrine has long been thought to preclude a use that would
simply supersede the use of the original.307  Courts have stated that “the
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use.”308  To be transformative, the new work must add “something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with
new expression, meaning or message.”309  This first factor will entail a
case-by-case factual analysis if applied to consumer branding activities and
brand communities.  Many brand communities, like the community
formed around the IKEAhackers website, are not created as commercial
undertakings.
However, the ease of adding revenue-generating advertisements to a
brand community website may result in some commercial aspect to these
otherwise non-profit groups.  For example, the IKEAHackers website crea-
tor eventually added advertising to the site in order to compensate for the
time commitment of running the community once it became larger and
302. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1)–(4) (2012).
303. See id. § 107(1).
304. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
305. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198
(3d Cir. 2003).
306. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (discussing degree of transformation and
how it factors into analysis).
307. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901); accord Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551
(1985).
308. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
309. See id.
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more complex.  Commercial activity such as this may tilt the scales against
a finding of fair use.  However, this one factor alone would not be disposi-
tive, so courts would be asked to undertake a more nuanced analysis.
The same uncertainty is present regarding whether consumer-brand-
ing activities could be considered transformative.  If they are determined
to be transformative, that would lessen the effect of any commercial aspect
of their use.  It is certainly possible that some consumers would build upon
a brand’s trademarks and brand story to create “something new,” which
could include a new direction for the brand to take.  In the example of the
Saab brand community discussed above, the community members actively
displayed the Saab trademark and circulated Saab promotional and educa-
tional materials.  This use of copyrighted materials seems very straightfor-
ward and not very transformative in the traditional sense.  However, the
infringing use could certainly entail a new purpose or meaning.  As brand
communities have been studied and shown to possess the same social char-
acteristics of other types of communities, the purpose underlying such
communities could be described as social and psychological, rather than
the sales-oriented commercial purpose motivating the brand owner.  It is
unclear whether this would be enough to call brand communities trans-
formative.  If so, this would lessen the fair use impact of any commercial
revenue generated and cause this factor to weigh in favor of the fair use
defense.
Under an analysis of the second statutory fair use factor, the court
must take into consideration the nature of the copyrighted work.310  An
examination of this factor recognizes the reality that “some works are
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others.”311  For
example, Feist held that creative works are entitled to more stringent copy-
right protection than factual works because there is a presumptively
greater need to disseminate facts to the public.312  However, simply be-
cause a work is creative in nature does not preclude the fair use defense.
Additionally, “the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished
works” in order to protect the author’s exclusive right to first publica-
tion.313  As discussed above, when analyzing the copyrightability of brand-
ing activities taken by the brand owner, most brand activities can be seen
as creative in nature.  As they are produced specifically to inform and per-
suade consumers, it is clear that they are not subject to the increased pro-
tection granted to unpublished works.  However, the protectable, creative
expression contained in branding works would be entitled to the en-
hanced protection for creative works.  Therefore, this factor would consist-
ently tilt in favor of the brand owner over the infringing consumer.
310. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012).
311. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
312. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991)
(holding copyright protects works with de minimus level of creativity).
313. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564
(1985).
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Analysis of the “amount and substantiality of the portion used,” under
the third fair use factor, requires consideration of both the quantity as well
as the quality and importance of the portion of the copyrighted work used
“in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole . . . .”314  There is no
bright-line rule specifying exactly how much copying is “too much” to be
considered fair use.  Courts have found that taking a few seconds from
several minutes of video footage was substantial copying,315 yet the use of
an entire copyrighted Barbie doll in artistic parody photographs was
deemed permissible.316
In Harper, taking only a small number of quotations from an autobio-
graphical book was found to be unfair due to the fact that the portions
taken captured the commercial heart or essence of the copyrighted
work.317  Therefore, courts must determine in each instance whether the
use made by the defendant was reasonable and fair in terms of both quan-
tity and quality.  This will also need a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis.
In the case of the IKEAHackers website, which included some reference to
IKEA’s trademarks and goods for sale, most of the content was user-gener-
ated, so the extent of copyrighted content used might be considered
rather small.  Conversely, the Saab brand community actively circulated
copyrighted materials produced by the brand owner for informational and
community membership purposes, so their level of use might be consid-
ered more extensive.
The fourth fair use factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”318  In Harper, the court said
“This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use.”319  In order to determine the effect on the market for a plaintiff’s
copyrighted work, the court must consider the extent of the market harm
caused by the alleged infringer as well as the magnitude of harm that
could be caused if such infringement was widespread.320  The extent of
harm refers not only to the obvious harm caused if an infringing use takes
some of the original market, but also harm to the market for derivative
works that could have been rightfully produced by the copyright
holder.321  Courts must attempt to “strike a balance between ‘the benefit
314. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3); see also Harper, 471 U.S. at 564–65.
315. See L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 940–42 (9th Cir.
2002).
316. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir.
2003).
317. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 566; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (“[T]aking the heart of the original and making it the
heart of a new work [i]s to purloin a substantial portion of the essence of the
original.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
318. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
319. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 566.
320. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 602–03.
321. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 541.
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the public will derive if the use is permitted and the personal gain the
copyright owner will receive if the use is denied.’”322
Since this fourth factor has been called the most important factor in
the fair use analysis, it is noteworthy that consumer-initiated branding has
been shown to have positive effects on the market for the brand owner’s
products.  Analysis of this factor is imperfect, as brand-related copyrighted
works generally do not have value in and of themselves.  A commercial or
branded website may cost the brand owner a substantial amount to create,
and that cost is not recouped by sales of the commercial or through web-
site memberships in the way that might apply to sales of copyrighted books
or films.  For the purposes of branding works, the relevant market value is
the marketing value.  The brand owner is looking for a return on its
branding investment in the form of increased sales of the affiliated prod-
uct.  If consumer-initiated branding activities assist in this effort to in-
crease product sales, then this factor should weigh heavily in favor of a
finding of fair use.
In any copyright fair use analysis, there is bound to be uncertainty
about how the various factors will balance out in the eyes of a court.  How-
ever, consumer-initiated brand uses seem to have a greater likelihood of
success under copyright fair use than under trademark fair use.  The
multi-factor test under copyright fair use allows for a more nuanced assess-
ment of whether a consumer’s use of a brand story is unfairly taking ad-
vantage of the underlying work or likely to replace the market for the
underlying work.  In many instances, the branded work would receive a
benefit from the consumer’s derivative work, and fair use should prevail.
A wise brand owner would only challenge these consumer derivative works
in rare instances; therefore, the concerns of trademark scholars regarding
the potential of trademark fair use to chill free speech would be mini-
mized as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
A copyright framework for brands offers a number of benefits to
brand owners, consumers, and those seeking to reign in the expansion of
trademark law.  Because brands are a modern phenomenon, there will al-
ways be some inconsistencies when trying to accommodate brand develop-
ment under established legal paradigms.323  Copyright law may need time
and modifications to adjust to brands, but this adjustment should be less
disruptive than the expansion being forced upon trademark law.  As it
stands, copyright law is well-suited to recognize the original and creative
work that is invested in the development of a brand.  Individual advertis-
322. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 804–05 (9th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d
1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997)).
323. In a forthcoming project, I explore whether an entirely new “brandright”
regime would better address the needs of brand owners and respect the estab-
lished boundaries of trademark and copyright law.
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ing works already receive some protection under copyright law, so incor-
porating branding more generally is a logical next step.  Additionally,
reframing brands as copyrighted works allows for the treatment of con-
sumer-initiated brand activities in a fashion similar to fanfiction.  Brand
owners recognize the value of consumer involvement in their marketing
efforts and desire the ability to utilize brand communities to further de-
velop brand loyalty.  Copyright law allows brand owners to encourage con-
sumer involvement in branding without the fear of losing one’s rights,
which brand owners currently experience under trademark law.  Copy-
right law allows brand owners to have discretion over the kinds of con-
sumer activities that will be permitted or ignored, while also allowing some
freedom for unauthorized expressive uses of a brand story through copy-
right fair use.  This is a better approach for both brand owners and
consumers.
Reframing brands as copyrightable works is also better for trademark
law.  Brand theory explains how the modern expansion of trademark law,
which has been maligned by numerous trademark scholars and practition-
ers, is an effort to accommodate brands under the rubric of trademark.
However, trademark law has adopted a conception of brands that is dated
and that does not recognize the high level of consumer involvement in
modern branding efforts.  Trademark law now faces the paradoxical di-
lemma of protecting brand owners’ investment in developing brands while
stifling the ability of those owners to pursue consumer involvement in
branding, which has been described in marketing research as the required
next step for companies seeking to respond to a cluttered marketplace
and increasing consumer cynicism.  Trademark law’s established require-
ments that prevent genericide, police third-party trademark use, and mon-
itor quality control in licenses all reflect the role of trademarks in
identifying the source of goods and protecting consumers from deception
in the marketplace.  However, these rules are ill-suited to address the fun-
damental needs of brand owners.  Brands are not simply large trademarks.
They are creative works that invite consumer participation and encourage
consumers to engage in expressive uses of the brand.  Marketing scholar-
ship has already recognized this and noted that the future of branding will
entail brands as the center of communities and cultural discourse.  It is
time for trademark law to release its grip on brands and allow them to be
adopted under the umbrella of copyright law.
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